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POLICING THE IMMIGRANT IDENTITY 
Eda Katharine Tinto* 
Abstract 
Information concerning an immigrant’s “identity” is critical evidence 
used by the government in a deportation proceeding. Today, the 
government collects immigrant identity evidence in a variety of ways: a 
local police officer conducts a traffic stop and obtains a driver’s name 
and date of birth, fingerprints taken at booking link to previously acquired 
biographical information, and a search of a national database reveals a 
person’s country of origin. Data suggests that in an increasing number of 
cases, police collect immigrant identity evidence following an unlawful 
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. In immigration proceedings, courts may suppress evidence 
obtained in egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment through 
application of the exclusionary rule. Under current doctrine, when the 
suppression of identity evidence is at issue, courts make a factual inquiry 
as to whether the police collected the identity evidence for an 
investigative purpose, which would warrant suppression, or for an 
administrative purpose, which would not. Despite this purpose-based 
standard, the policing underlying immigrant identity evidence collection 
has received almost no judicial or scholarly scrutiny. Instead, courts 
frequently assume that police collect all immigrant identity evidence for 
an administrative purpose since the government ultimately introduces it 
in an administrative immigration proceeding.  
This Article’s examination of immigrant identity evidence reveals 
that, contrary to traditional assumptions, the collection of such evidence 
is no longer accurately assumed to be administrative in nature. Instead, 
in today’s world of immigration policing, the collection of immigrant 
identity evidence is often investigative in its underlying purpose due to 
the expanding role of local law enforcement in federal immigration 
enforcement, the expansion of government databases, and the growth of 
immigration-related offenses. Consequently, in the immigration context, 
current exclusionary rule doctrine often wrongly shields evidence from 
suppression that the rule normatively intends to suppress and unwittingly 
undermines the animating function of the exclusionary rule—the 
deterrence of unconstitutional police misconduct. In light of this analysis, 
this Article concludes by offering specific reforms to exclusionary rule 
doctrine governing the suppression of immigrant identity evidence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information concerning an immigrant’s “identity” is critical evidence 
used by the government in a deportation proceeding. When seeking to 
deport a noncitizen from the United States, the federal government has 
the evidentiary burden of proving the individual’s identity and status as a 
noncitizen.1 Thus, “identity evidence” is the primary evidence in the 
government’s removal case against a noncitizen. Although the term 
“identity evidence” is admittedly an amorphous one, this Article, along 
with most courts, uses this term to signify evidence related to an 
individual’s identity2—such as an individual’s name, date of birth, 
fingerprints, and country of origin.3  
                                                                                                                     
 1. See In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 79 (B.I.A. 1970). Immigration proceedings, 
often colloquially referred to as “deportation” proceedings, are now referred to by statute as 
“removal” proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). Because the term “deportation” is more familiar 
to readers, and for this Article’s purposes essentially the same as “removal,” this Article uses both 
terms interchangeably. Judges within the Executive Office of Immigration Review, an 
administrative court system under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Justice, handle 
immigration proceedings. Removal proceedings comprise the overwhelming majority of matters 
before immigration courts. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. For a concise overview of 
the removal process, see Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal 
Proceedings, 89 TULANE L. REV. 1, 14–17 (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2007) (relating 
identity evidence to information “sufficiently identity-related”); United States v. Perez-Partida, 
773 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1056–58 (D.N.M. 2011) (describing identity evidence as the name, date of 
birth, place of birth, and fingerprints of an individual).  
 3. See Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 232 n.5 (fingerprints); United States v. Stamper, 91 Fed. 
Appx. 445, 457 (6th Cir. 2004) (name); Perez-Partida, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1056–58 (name, date 
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Today, the government collects identity evidence in a variety of ways. 
A local police officer conducts a traffic stop and obtains a driver’s name 
and date of birth,4 fingerprints taken during the booking process link to 
previously collected biographical information,5 and a search of a 
government database reveals a record containing a person’s country of 
origin.6 In some cases, identity evidence is collected by law enforcement 
following an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.7 In fact, quantitative and qualitative 
data suggest that, in recent years, allegations and instances of unlawful 
racial profiling and other unconstitutional police conduct targeting 
noncitizens, such as warrantless home and workplace raids, have 
significantly increased in number.8 
In criminal proceedings, the exclusionary rule serves to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of police conduct in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.9 In immigration proceedings, the exclusionary rule only 
applies if police obtained evidence as a result of an “egregious” violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.10 Consequently, noncitizens in immigration 
court must first allege an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment 
and then move to suppress the evidence collected by law enforcement 
following the egregious constitutional violation.  
                                                                                                                     
of birth, place of birth, and fingerprints). “Identity evidence” is of course a broad term that also 
includes evidence such as DNA and physical descriptors of individuals.  
 4. People v. Tejada, 270 A.D. 2d 655, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting that during a 
traffic stop, the officer requested the defendant’s “name, date of birth, where he was coming from 
and his destination”).   
 5. See United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 6. See infra notes 159–67 and accompanying text.  
 7. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.  
 8. See infra notes 255–57 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217–18 (1960) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also discussion infra Section I.A 
(discussing the exclusionary rule). 
 10. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court stated that, although the exclusionary rule 
did not generally apply to civil immigration proceedings, evidence obtained via “egregious 
violations of [the] Fourth Amendment” may warrant the application of the exclusionary rule in 
immigration court. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). Although only a plurality of Justices made this 
suggestion, four dissenting Justices argued that the exclusionary rule should apply generally in 
immigration proceedings. Id. at 1051–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1053 (White, J., 
dissenting); id. at 1060–61 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even 
though there are important qualifications to the following statement, broadly speaking, the 
majority of federal circuits recognize that the exclusionary rule may apply in immigration 
proceedings when officers obtain evidence in egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 
Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary 
Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 503–27 
(2013); see also infra notes 102–07 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of 
“egregiousness”). 
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Scholars and courts have grappled with the immediate questions 
raised by this limited availability of the exclusionary rule, such as how to 
define “egregiousness” and what type of police misconduct rises to this 
level.11 In addition, scholars have argued that due to the widespread 
occurrence of Fourth Amendment violations against noncitizens, the 
exclusionary rule should now apply more broadly in immigration 
proceedings, that is, it should be available as a remedy even for “non-
egregious” Fourth Amendment violations, as it is in criminal 
proceedings.12 But there has been little consideration given to an 
important subsequent question: if there is indeed an egregious 
constitutional violation, or even if the exclusionary rule remedy was 
available more broadly, what evidence should then be suppressed under 
operation of the exclusionary rule in immigration court? 
It is important to remember that courts do not automatically suppress 
evidence upon a finding of unconstitutional police conduct. Rather, once 
the requisite Fourth Amendment violation is found, courts in both 
criminal and immigration proceedings look to exclusionary rule doctrine 
to determine whether suppression is appropriate or whether the 
exceptions and limitations to the exclusionary rule render the evidence 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 10, at 526–30 (presenting courts’ disagreements over the 
definition of egregiousness); Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: 
Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 525 (2011) 
(arguing that warrantless home raids conducted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
meet the definition of an “egregious violation”); cf. United States v. Sanders, 743 F.3d 471, 474 
(7th Cir. 2014) (stating in a criminal case that “it is hard to understand how an ‘egregious’ 
violation could be defined in a way that is both administrable and distinguishes severe from other 
violations”). 
 12. The Court in Lopez-Mendoza suggested that the exclusionary rule might generally apply 
to immigration proceedings if “Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread.” 
468 U.S. at 1050. Several scholars have argued that the exclusionary rule should now be available 
as a remedy in immigration proceedings under this reasoning. See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, “Good 
Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration 
Enforcement and the Case for Revising Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (arguing 
that Fourth Amendment violations in the immigration context are geographically and 
institutionally widespread, and therefore the exclusionary rule should apply more broadly); 
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1084, 1114 (2004) (arguing that data of immigration-related arrests supports the notion that 
Fourth Amendment violations are widespread, and therefore the exclusionary rule should apply 
more generally in the immigration context). Notably, some scholars have pointed out broader 
systemic and doctrinal concerns with allowing a more limited exclusionary rule in the immigration 
context. See, e.g., David Gray, Meagan Cooper & David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s 
Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 15, 35 (2012) (arguing that allowing 
the collateral use of suppressed evidence in immigration proceedings has revived a misguided 
“silver platter doctrine”); Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1885, 1939 (2014) (suggesting that an exclusionary rule rooted in the Due Process Clause may 
apply to deportation proceedings though not to other civil proceedings). 
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not subject to suppression, despite the initial constitutional violation.13  
Virtually all immigration court proceedings are cases in which the 
government is trying to remove a person from the United States.14 In 
these proceedings, identity evidence is the critical evidence, and very 
often the only evidence, in the government’s case against the 
noncitizen.15 Therefore, in the immigration context, the general question 
as to what evidence may be suppressed under application of the 
exclusionary rule is, for all practical purposes, a more specific question 
of whether and when identity evidence may be suppressed.  
Almost all of the discussion surrounding the suppression of identity 
evidence has taken place in the context of a criminal case.16 There is 
virtually no scholarly or judicial analysis of the suppression of identity 
evidence in immigration proceedings. This is not, in and of itself, that 
surprising. Exclusionary rule doctrine has almost exclusively developed 
in the criminal context because criminal cases are the predominant setting 
for considering factual allegations of police misconduct and evaluating 
the scope of the exclusionary rule.17 But this lack of immigration-specific 
analysis, though perhaps understandable, is problematic. As described in 
this Article, exclusionary rule doctrine governing the suppression of 
identity evidence contains a fact-based standard that requires a court to 
consider the specific manner of the identity evidence collection.18 Thus, 
the fact that this analysis is not taking place in the immigration context 
suggests that an analysis of law enforcement’s collection of immigrant 
identity evidence is being neglected or ignored. Furthermore, although 
immigration law scholars often call for the introduction of substantive 
criminal constitutional protections—traditionally absent in the civil 
sphere of immigration19—an examination of current exclusionary rule 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See discussion infra Section I.A (discussing traditional exclusionary rule analysis of 
taint, attenuation, and “fruit of the poisonous tree”). 
 14. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration 
Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2015) (documenting that ninety-seven percent of all 
immigration proceedings are removal proceedings). 
 15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 16. See People v. Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (N.Y. 2010). See generally Wayne A. 
Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561 (2012) (discussing the limits of identity evidence). 
As discussed in more detail in Section I.B., the bulk of the judicial debate surrounding the 
suppression of identity evidence takes place in immigration-related criminal cases. See infra notes 
77–81. 
 17. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. See generally Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. 
Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 391 (2010) (presenting an overview of Supreme Court exclusionary rule 
jurisprudence). 
 18. See discussion infra Section I.B.  
 19. See, e.g., Beth Caldwell, Banished for Life: Deportation of Juvenile Offenders as Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2294–95 (2013) (arguing for the Eighth 
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doctrine as applied to immigrant identity evidence raises serious doubts 
as to whether this doctrine as developed in the criminal context should be 
imported into the immigration arena.20  
Consider a scenario in which these issues would arise: A local police 
officer conducts a traffic stop, pulling over an individual driver for 
allegedly speeding. The driver will later contend that the officer stopped 
him solely on the basis of his race. After pulling the driver over, the 
officer questions the driver, asking his name and date of birth; where he 
was going to and coming from; and, eventually, his immigration status 
and where he was born. The driver admits that he was born in Mexico 
and does not currently have legal permission to live in the United States. 
The officer memorializes these admissions, issues a traffic ticket, and 
then calls Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).21 A federal 
immigration officer arrives and ultimately the driver is placed in removal 
proceedings. In immigration court, the government seeks to admit 
evidence regarding the driver’s identity into evidence (e.g., the driver’s 
statements to the police officer and his Mexican birth certificate). The 
noncitizen argues, and the immigration judge agrees, that the traffic stop 
was based solely on the driver’s race and was therefore an egregious 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.22 The noncitizen then moves to 
suppress the government’s identity evidence. The judge must now decide 
whether exclusionary rule doctrine permits the suppression of the identity 
evidence in question. 
At first glance, federal courts appear divided into two opposing 
positions on the question of whether the exclusionary rule generally 
                                                                                                                     
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to apply to deportation 
proceedings); Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2301 (2013) (suggesting 
a constitutional right to counsel for some immigration cases); Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the 
Punishment?: Recent Judicial Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 
1, 22 (2011) (stating that courts should import criminal protections such as proportionality, 
suppression, and right to counsel into immigration proceedings); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling 
the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration 
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 289, 298 (2008) (arguing that 
courts should apply the protections of the Sixth Amendment, Ex Post Facto Clause, and 
evidentiary rules to deportation proceedings).  
 20. Cf. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (2010) 
(observing that underlying the scholarly calls for criminal protections is “the belief that these 
protections do, in fact, operate in the criminal sphere” and suggesting that their interaction with 
the civil immigration sphere has affected these same protections in the criminal context).  
 21. ICE is the principle investigative and enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Who We Are, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Oct. 12, 
2016). 
 22. Courts are likely to find a traffic stop based solely on race to be an egregious violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. See Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1451–52 (9th Cir. 1994); 
David Antonio Lara-Torres, A094 218 294, 2014 WL 1120165, at *2 (B.I.A. Jan. 28, 2014). 
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applies to identity evidence.23 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, 
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits broadly state that 
identity evidence may not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.24 In 
contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits support the principle that identity evidence may 
be suppressed via the exclusionary rule.25 The framing of this doctrinal 
question as one subject to a “circuit split,”26 however, is insufficient for 
a full understanding of the suppression remedy as applied to identity 
evidence and is in fact misleading to one’s perception of how the 
exclusionary rule currently operates in practice. What seem like broad, 
categorical, and opposing rules governing the suppression of identity 
evidence are in actuality more complex, fact-based, and overlapping 
evidentiary standards.  
When evaluating the suppression of identity evidence, courts on both 
sides of the debate often distinguish between identity evidence collected 
for an investigative purpose, which courts should suppress, and identity 
evidence collected for an administrative purpose, which courts should not 
suppress.27 Thus, notwithstanding these seemingly categorical rules, 
when determining the applicability of the exclusionary rule to any 
particular piece of identity evidence, courts use, explicitly and implicitly, 
a fact-based “investigative versus administrative” standard. For example, 
to account for Supreme Court precedent suppressing fingerprint 
evidence, the “identity evidence cannot be suppressed” side of the debate 
acknowledges that fingerprints taken for an investigative purpose may 
sometimes be suppressed.28 Similarly, the “identity evidence can be 
suppressed” camp recognizes that some forms of identity evidence, such 
as facts obtained through the administrative booking process, are often 
exempt from suppression.29 In short, despite the proclaimed doctrinal 
divide, in practice there are often analytical commonalities and matching 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 24. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 26. Commentators and courts have labeled this question as being the subject of a “split.” 
See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, 721 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2013); LEGAL 
ACTION CTR., AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN REMOVAL 
PROCEEDINGS: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 2 (2015). 
 27. See discussion infra Section I.B. Substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine also contains 
a similar distinction between investigative searches and searches justified by administrative or 
governmental “special needs.” See Eve Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 254, 255–56 (discussing administrative searches in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment). That distinction is not relevant for this Article’s purposes here. The discussion of 
exclusionary rule doctrine regarding identity evidence necessarily only takes place after the 
finding of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
 28. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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results when answering the question of whether a particular piece of 
identity evidence may be suppressed in a particular case.  
Thus, exclusionary rule doctrine regarding the suppression of identity 
evidence does not contain simple categorical rules but a fact-based 
standard that requires an individual case-by-case analysis. To return to 
the hypothetical, the answer to the question of whether an immigration 
court would suppress the evidence of the driver’s identity would depend 
not only on the circuit in which the case arose but also on the manner of 
the evidence collection and the purpose for which the police collected the 
evidence. Currently, however, instead of conducting this necessary 
analysis, most courts assume that when applying the investigative versus 
administrative standard, all identity evidence ultimately presented in an 
administrative immigration proceeding was collected for an 
administrative purpose and, as such, is categorically exempt from the 
exclusionary rule remedy.30  
This assumption, while not inherently leading to an incorrect result, 
does raise two significant concerns. First, there is the potential for a 
categorical exception for identity evidence to swallow the rule, thereby 
essentially cancelling any remedy for the initial constitutional violation.31 
This is particularly troubling in the immigration context because the 
police conduct is, by definition, an egregious violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights.32 Second, allowing a categorical exception to the 
exclusionary rule effectively enables courts to avoid answering the 
question of whether there was a constitutional violation in the first place, 
thus shielding law enforcement practices from judicial scrutiny.33 While 
a wrong without a remedy or an exception to a rule may ultimately have 
its place in exclusionary rule doctrine, these outcomes should be 
analytically justified rather than assumed. 
In light of these concerns, this Article undertakes the needed analysis 
of the suppression of identity evidence in immigration proceedings. An 
examination of immigrant identity evidence demonstrates that courts 
inaccurately assume the collection of such evidence to be administrative 
in nature. Instead, due to the expanding role of state and local police in 
federal immigration enforcement,34 the expansion of the storage of 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(assuming “arguendo” that the district court’s finding of a Fourth Amendment violation was 
correct but holding that identity evidence is not suppressible). 
 32. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 33. See, e.g., Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not determine whether there was an egregious violation of the 
Fourth Amendment because the court instead found that an exception to the exclusionary rule was 
applicable). 
 34. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.1. 
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personal information in electronic databases,35 and the role of an 
individual’s name and date of birth in the investigation of immigration-
related offenses,36 immigration policing today is often investigative in its 
underlying purpose. Consequently, exclusionary rule doctrine as 
currently applied to immigrant identity evidence often wrongly shields 
evidence from suppression that the rule normatively intends to suppress 
and unwittingly undermines the animating function of the exclusionary 
rule—the deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct.37 This Article 
argues, therefore, that rather than simply transferring exclusionary rule 
doctrine from one forum to another, the combination of the investigative 
policing of a noncitizen’s identity and the administrative proceedings in 
which the government uses this identity evidence justifies exclusionary 
rule doctrine unique to the immigration court context.  
Part I begins by presenting an overview of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule and its rationale as a mechanism for the deterrence of 
unconstitutional police conduct. This Part then discusses the debate over 
the suppression of identity evidence currently taking place in the federal 
criminal court context. Part I explains that rather than a “can be 
suppressed” and “can never be suppressed” dichotomy, the exclusionary 
rule doctrine is more complex and primarily looks to the underlying 
purpose of the evidence collection, distinguishing between investigative 
and administrative police purposes.  
Part II begins with the observation that the questions surrounding the 
suppression of identity evidence in immigration proceedings have 
received almost no close inspection. This Part supplies this missing 
analysis, using the current framework of the investigative versus 
administrative standard. Part II also discusses the evolution of 
immigration enforcement and examines police practices through the lens 
of three categories of identity evidence, each of which warrants a distinct 
evidentiary analysis under exclusionary rule doctrine. This examination 
demonstrates that exclusionary rule doctrine as applied to identity 
evidence in criminal court is, at minimum, unhelpful to the judicial 
inquiry in the immigration context and more fundamentally—and more 
problematically—produces a result in immigration court that is often 
contrary to the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule.  
In light of these findings, Part III posits that current exclusionary rule 
doctrine with respect to immigrant identity evidence is neither functional 
in practice nor desirable as doctrine. Therefore, this Article concludes by 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 36. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.3. 
 37. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusionary rule’s function as 
a mechanism of deterrence). 
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proposing revisions to exclusionary rule doctrine in immigration 
proceedings, including the abandonment of the purpose-based standard.38 
This Article grounds these proposals in the recognition that the 
application of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings today 
addresses a unique blend of criminal and civil law, investigative and 
administrative police practices, and lawful and unlawful law enforcement 
conduct. 
I.  THE SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 
To effectively analyze exclusionary rule doctrine as applied in 
immigration proceedings, it is helpful to first have a broader 
understanding of the suppression of evidence generally and the 
suppression of identity evidence in the criminal justice system 
specifically. Part I begins with a brief review of this doctrine and then 
presents the current approaches of the federal circuits to the suppression 
of identity evidence. 
A.  The Exclusionary Rule 
Despite much debate and doctrinal adjustments, the exclusionary rule 
remains a bedrock principle of Fourth Amendment law. Historically, 
courts and scholars have recognized the exclusionary rule as having 
several justifications, including preserving “judicial integrity” and 
ensuring public trust in the government.39 In contemporary jurisprudence, 
however, the primary, if not the only, rationale for the application of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional police conduct.40 From this 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See infra discussion Part III (suggesting that the traditional exclusionary rule analysis 
as applied to other types of evidence should also govern the suppression of immigrant identity 
evidence); see also infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text (describing the “traditional” 
exclusionary rule analysis of taint, attenuation, and the term “fruit of the poisonous tree”). 
 39. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.1(f) (5th ed. 2013) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)) 
(discussing various purposes of the exclusionary rule); see also Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary 
Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 262 (1998) 
(suggesting additional justification of restoring both the government and suspect to the status quo 
ante). 
 40. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (“The rule’s sole purpose, we have 
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”); Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (stating that “the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only 
where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 
(1984))); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule’s 
“prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 39, 
§ 1.1(f) (noting the Court’s recent focus as “almost exclusively upon the deterrence function”). 
More fundamentally, the Supreme Court has moved away from viewing the exclusionary rule as 
a remedy embedded in the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment to the opinion that 
it is a judicially created remedy. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that 
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perspective, the exclusionary rule remedy is not intended to be a 
punishment for past unconstitutional police conduct but is instead applied 
to deter future wrongdoing by law enforcement. The remedy “is 
calculated to prevent, not to repair.”41  
In determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply in any 
particular case, the Supreme Court has constructed a balancing test of the 
costs and benefits of the rule’s application.42 When considered in tandem 
with the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule, this balancing 
dictates that the exclusionary rule should only apply if the deterrence 
benefits from its application outweigh the social costs that suppression of 
the evidence would incur.43 “Where suppression fails to yield 
‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly unwarranted.’”44 This cost 
versus deterrent–benefit analysis also governs the exclusionary rule’s 
expansion outside the criminal trial context.45  
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,46 the Supreme Court held that the 
exclusionary rule did not generally apply to civil immigration 
proceedings.47 After weighing the costs of suppression with the possible 
benefits of deterrence, the Court concluded that this balancing “comes 
out against applying the exclusionary rule.”48 However, the Court stated 
that the exclusionary rule might apply in immigration court following 
“egregious violations” of the Fourth Amendment.49 Today, the majority 
of the federal circuits and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
recognize that the exclusionary rule is available in immigration 
proceedings as a remedy for egregious violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.50  
                                                                                                                     
“the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments”), with 
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (calling the exclusionary rule a “judicially created remedy”).  
 41. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
 42. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448–54 (1976). 
 43. E.g., Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426–27.  
 44. United States v. Weaver, 808 F.3d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2426–27). 
 45. See, e.g., Janis, 428 U.S. at 459–60 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply 
in federal civil tax proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349–52 (declining to extend the 
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 (1976) 
(concluding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to habeas proceedings).  
 46. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).   
 47. Id. at 1050; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273–74 (1973). The 
Supreme Court had previously held that noncitizens are entitled to the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882–84 (1975).  
 48. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 503–27 (reviewing federal and immigration case law on 
egregious violations). Several circuits, although potentially or theoretically recognizing the 
exception, have never found “egregiousness” on the facts before the court. See, e.g., Martinez 
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When the exclusionary rule does apply, it serves to suppress evidence 
obtained both as a direct and indirect result of the Fourth Amendment 
violation.51 As famously held by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. 
United States,52 in addition to evidence directly obtained as a result of a 
Fourth Amendment violation, evidence that is “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” is also suppressible.53 Evidence is not automatically suppressed, 
however, simply because the constitutional violation serves as the “but 
for” cause of the evidence collection.54 Rather, evidence is only 
considered fruit of the poisonous tree “if the link between the evidence 
and the conduct is not too attenuated.”55 Thus, under what this Article 
calls the traditional exclusionary rule analysis, a court must ask whether 
the officers “exploited” the initial illegality to obtain the evidence or 
whether the officers obtained the evidence by means “purged of the 
primary taint.”56 
A well-established exception to the exclusionary rule is evidence 
obtained from an independent source. “Independent” evidence is 
categorically exempt “from the suppression remedy because it is viewed 
as sufficiently attenuated from, or not tainted by, the initial unlawful 
search or seizure.57 This exception ensures that the police are put “in the 
same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error 
or misconduct had occurred.”58 Like the exclusionary rule generally, the 
underlying rationale is focused on balancing the benefit of deterrence and 
                                                                                                                     
Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 2013); see infra notes 102–07 (discussing the 
definition of egregiousness). 
 51. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). 
 52. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 53. Id. at 488.  
 54. Id. at 487–88.  
 55. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1984) (citing Wong Sun). 
 56. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 
221 (1959)). In making this determination of attenuation, a court considers several factors, including 
the “temporal proximity” between the unlawful police conduct and the obtaining of the evidence, 
the presence of any intervening circumstances, and, “particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975). If the court finds the police 
exploited the initial constitutional violation to collect the contested evidence, the suppression remedy 
covers many types of evidence, including physical evidence, officers’ observations, and the 
defendant’s oral and written statements. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980). 
 57. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Segura v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984). In theory, a truly independent source of evidence will not satisfy 
even a “but for” test of causation stemming from the initial unconstitutional police conduct. In 
practice, however, the question of independence is often one of degree and entails a fact-specific 
analysis. United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 99–100 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 58. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431, 443 (1984)). 
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the cost of suppression.59 According to this reasoning, there is no need 
to—and society does not want to—deter police officers from lawful 
investigations that independently lead them to probative evidence.60 By 
limiting the scope of the suppression remedy to simply putting the police 
back to where they would have been, minus the unlawful conduct, 
sufficient deterrence of unlawful conduct will remain without the more 
severe cost of excluding evidence that was, at least in the opinion of the 
decision maker, independently obtained.61  
Evidence collected during the routine booking process is also 
frequently deemed to be sufficiently attenuated from, or independent of, 
the initial Fourth Amendment violation and therefore outside the reach of 
the suppression remedy. Courts have long recognized that evidence 
obtained during the “standardized procedure” of the booking process is 
not subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.62 
Consequently, when courts confront questions regarding the suppression 
of evidence obtained during the booking process but following an 
unlawful arrest, many have found that the exclusionary rule is not 
applicable to the evidence collected.63 These courts reason that there is 
little need to deter the police from asking routine booking questions 
because the booking process is collective and administrative and not 
aimed at gathering evidence of any particular crime.64  
                                                                                                                     
 59. See id. at 537–39 (discussing the history and rationale of the independent source 
exception); see also id. at 544–45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The independent source 
exception . . . is primarily based on a practical view that under certain circumstances the beneficial 
deterrent effect that exclusion will have on future constitutional violations is too slight to justify 
the social cost of excluding probative evidence from a criminal trial.”). 
 60. See id. at 545 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 61. Another related exception to the exclusionary rule is the “inevitable discovery” 
exception. This exception allows the admission of evidence that would “inevitably have been 
discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 448. 
 62. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 
1958, 1977 (2013) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for administrative evidence 
collection during booking such as fingerprints and photographs). Courts see the collection of 
evidence during routine booking as lawfully motivated by the administrative purpose of 
accurately identifying those in police custody and ensuring the safety of custodial officers. See 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646 (holding inventory searches reasonable in part because “inspection of 
an arrestee’s personal property may assist the police in ascertaining or verifying his identity”); 
United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Certain routine 
administrative procedures, such as fingerprinting, photographing, and getting a proper name and 
address from the defendant, are incidental events accompanying an arrest that are necessary for 
orderly law enforcement and protection of individual rights.”).  
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Beckwith, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1293 (D. Utah 1998) (listing 
cases that hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply to photographs obtained during routine 
booking).  
 64. A court may permit the suppression of evidence obtained during booking, however, if 
the court finds that the police “exploited” the unlawful arrest to obtain the very evidence typically 
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B.  Identity Evidence 
The doctrinal question of whether identity evidence is subject to 
suppression via the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule can be 
answered quite differently depending on one’s analytical viewpoint of the 
term “identity.” On the one hand, identity as defined by a defendant’s 
physical body is not suppressible.65 The Ker–Frisbie doctrine holds that 
an unconstitutional search or seizure cannot divest a court of jurisdiction 
over the defendant.66 Although this rule is at its roots a rule of personal 
jurisdiction, it functions as a limit on the exclusionary rule—a 
defendant’s body cannot be suppressed.   
On the other hand, under Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is clear that 
some evidence of identity is suppressible following a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. In Davis v. Mississippi,67 and again in Hayes v. 
Florida,68 the Supreme Court held that fingerprint evidence could be 
suppressed following an unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.69 In both Davis and Hayes, the police collected fingerprints 
from the suspect after unlawfully arresting him for the purpose of 
connecting him to a specific crime.70 In neither Davis nor Hayes, 
however, did the Court address the suppression of identity evidence more 
broadly or discuss (or differentiate) the Ker–Frisbie rule of personal 
jurisdiction.  
Today, the debate over whether identity evidence is categorically 
subject to the exclusionary rule is rooted in a disagreement over a 
statement made by the Supreme Court in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza. The case 
consolidated the appeals of Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-
Sanchez.71 Both challenged aspects of their deportation proceedings on 
the basis of their allegedly unlawful arrests by immigration law 
enforcement officers.72 Lopez-Mendoza challenged the entirety of the 
immigration proceedings against him.73 The Court denied his appeal, 
holding that even if there was an unlawful arrest, an individual could not 
                                                                                                                     
collected during the booking process. See United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 232 (4th 
Cir. 2007).  
 65. Re, supra note 12, at 1959.   
 66. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 509, 522 (1952); 
see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660–62 (1992) (discussing the Ker–
Frisbie doctrine). 
 67. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
 68. 470 U.S. 811 (1984). 
 69. Id. at 816–18; Davis, 394 U.S. at 727–28. 
 70. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 812–14; Davis, 394 U.S. at 723. 
 71. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1034–35. 
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object to the very proceeding in which he is a party.74 In so holding, the 
Court stated, “[t]he ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a 
criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an 
unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or 
interrogation occurred.”75 This statement is now referred to as the Lopez-
Mendoza “identity statement.”76 
The federal circuit courts are divided into two positions on the 
meaning of the Lopez-Mendoza identity statement. The First, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits approach Lopez-Mendoza as a 
blanket prohibition on the suppression of identity evidence.77 The Fifth 
Circuit, for example, broadly proclaims that an individual’s identity is not 
suppressible.78 These courts ground their position in the plain language 
of the Lopez-Mendoza identity statement.79 In contrast, the Second, 
Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits do not view the Lopez-Mendoza 
identity statement as a categorical removal of identity evidence from the 
remedy of suppression.80 Rather, in their view, Lopez-Mendoza merely 
“reaffirmed a long-standing rule of personal jurisdiction”—the Ker–
Frisbie principle that one cannot contest one’s physical presence in 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 1040. 
 75. Id. at 1039. Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the admission of statements he made upon 
his arrest, arguing that the Court should exclude this evidence as “fruit of an unlawful arrest.” Id. 
at 1037. In rejecting Sandoval-Sanchez’s claim, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not 
generally apply to civil immigration proceedings but noted that this holding did not cover 
“egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties.” Id. at 1050.  
 76. E.g., Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 650 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 77. See United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 616 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 588 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Roque-
Villanueva, 175 F.3d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1999); cf. United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 
1181, 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that Lopez-Mendoza is not binding in this factual 
context but holding that identity evidence is not suppressible).   
 78. United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, 721 F.3d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 79. See, e.g., Bowley, 435 F.3d at 430 (stating that “we doubt that the Court lightly used 
such a sweeping word as ‘never’ in deciding when identity may be suppressed as the fruit of an 
illegal search of arrest”). 
 80. See Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 647–48 (stating that Lopez-Mendoza “did not announce a 
new rule insulating all identity-related evidence from suppression”); United States v. Oscar-
Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 231–32 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 
1112 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001). The 
most recent Ninth Circuit statement on this issue supports this reading of Lopez-Mendoza. See 
United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Lopez-Mendoza does not 
preclude suppression of evidence unlawfully obtained from a suspect that may in a criminal 
investigation establish the identity of the suspect.”). There is, however, prior case law in that 
circuit that supports the “can never be suppressed” interpretation as well. See United States v. Del 
Toro Gudino, 376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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court.81 Therefore, courts in these circuits have held that identity evidence 
may be subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule.82  
The meaning of the Lopez-Mendoza identity statement is a question 
in need of an answer.83 But of more significance to this Article’s purposes 
is the fact that this debate over one sentence has led both scholars and 
courts to view the broader question of whether identity evidence can be 
suppressed in a similar binary manner: identity evidence can be 
suppressed versus identity evidence cannot be suppressed. Judicial 
analysis has largely accepted this categorical framework as the current 
state of exclusionary rule doctrine. Stopping the inquiry here, however, 
allows much more complex doctrinal and evidentiary questions to escape 
notice.  
A closer examination of the application of the exclusionary rule to 
identity evidence in any particular case reveals a more complicated—and 
sometimes shared—analysis by courts on both sides of the debate. In 
courts on both sides, despite the broad, categorical proclamations, the 
question of whether identity evidence is subject to suppression remains a 
fact-based analysis—one that asks the court to review the nature of the 
underlying police conduct and to evaluate the purpose of the initial 
evidence collection. In light of the Supreme Court precedent of Hayes 
and Davis, which suppressed identity evidence collected during a police 
investigation, but also recognizing that identity evidence is often 
collected during the routine booking process, a purpose-based standard 
developed in exclusionary rule jurisprudence regarding the suppression 
of identity evidence. This analysis distinguishes between evidence 
collected for an “investigative” purpose and evidence collected for an 
“administrative” purpose. The general rule may be simplified as follows: 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 647–48 (discussing the Ker–Frisbie doctrine and its references 
in Lopez-Mendoza); Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1110–11 (same). It is interesting to note that 
the Court decided Hayes—a case in which the Court suppressed identity evidence—eight months 
after Lopez-Mendoza, and yet the Hayes opinion does not mention Lopez-Mendoza, much less 
discuss it as a limitation on the suppression of identity-related evidence. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 
U.S. 811 (1984). 
 82. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has not yet taken a position on this issue. 
Compare Delia Mercedes Sinche Barros, A088 142 068, 2012 WL 371685, at *2 (B.I.A. Jan. 12, 
2012) (“The identity of the respondent is not suppressible . . . .”), with Juan Carlos Guevara-Mata, 
A097-535-291, at *9 (B.I.A. June 14, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/130698575/Juan-
Carlos-Guevara-Mata-A097-535-291-BIA-June-14-2011 (affirming the immigration judge’s 
suppression of identity-related evidence). The BIA primarily follows the law of the circuit in 
which it sits. See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The BIA is required to 
follow court of appeals precedent within the geographical confines of the relevant circuit.”). 
 83. See Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 228 (“The meaning of the Lopez-Mendoza ‘identity 
statement’ has bedeviled and divided our sister circuits.”); United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 441 
F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2006) (Paez, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“One 
seemingly innocuous sentence . . . has led to amaranthine confusion.”). 
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identity evidence taken for investigative purposes may be suppressed, 
while evidence collected for administrative purposes is not subject to the 
exclusionary rule.  
Courts have not explicitly defined these diametrically used terms—
investigative versus administrative—in exclusionary rule doctrine. 
Instead, courts often use a “know it when I see it”84 approach. In general, 
an “investigative” purpose underlies evidence collected by police officers 
during the investigation of a crime.85 Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
suggests that an investigative purpose can be further defined as when “the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”86 In contrast, more 
standardized police practices addressing “administrative concerns,”87 
such as procedures and questions that are part of the custodial booking 
process, are conducted with an administrative purpose. In Fourth 
Amendment law more generally, the term “administrative” suggests 
police procedures that are “established routine,” rather than actions that 
are “a ruse . . . to discover incriminating evidence.”88 
Several jurisdictions recognize the investigative versus administrative 
standard explicitly.89 For example, the Tenth Circuit differentiates 
between evidence collected as part of a routine booking procedure and 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 85. See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 266–67 (1998) (discussing the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence’s 
general focus on criminal investigations). 
 86. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). This type of police conduct results in 
witness “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial” and therefore 
merit protection under the Confrontation Clause. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) 
(quoting the Amici Curiae Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.); 
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Crawford). 
 87. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) (holding that questions that 
address law enforcement’s “administrative concerns” fall outside the protections of Miranda). 
 88. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (discussing the Fourth Amendment inventory 
search doctrine); United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (same). 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Garcia-
Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 756 
(8th Cir. 2001); see also Jorge Hernandez-Calderon Elide Cruz-Azua, A200 672 287, 2014 WL 
2919262, at *1 (B.I.A. Apr. 29, 2014) (holding that the police took respondent’s fingerprints after 
his arrest for an “administrative purpose,” and therefore the fingerprints could not be suppressed); 
Christian Rodriguez, A088 190 226 (B.I.A. June 18, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/1501338 
88/Christian-Rodriguez-A088-190-226-BIA-June-18-2013 (contrasting fingerprints obtained for 
identification purposes from those taken for criminal investigation purposes); Eric Rey Cruz, 
A098 430 020, 2012 WL 3911826, at *2 (B.I.A. Aug. 22, 2012) (finding identity evidence 
admissible as it was “obtained for administrative purposes and not subject to suppression”). 
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evidence obtained during a police investigation.90 Courts that openly state 
this purpose-based standard are in the circuits that broadly proclaim that 
identity evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule. Consequently, 
despite these circuits’ posture as “can be suppressed” jurisdictions, there 
is a significant doctrinal dividing line that renders much identity evidence 
exempt from the exclusionary rule remedy. 
On the surface, the “can never be suppressed” jurisdictions may 
appear, with their blanket prohibition, to have rejected any fact-based 
standard that would potentially allow for the suppression of identity 
evidence. But even in these jurisdictions, to account for the precedent of 
Davis and Hayes, courts acknowledge that identity evidence may be 
suppressed under certain circumstances.91 For example, the Sixth Circuit 
distinguishes the suppression of fingerprint evidence, which might be 
permissible, from the suppression of a person’s name and date of birth, 
which is not.92 Although in neither case did the Supreme Court fully 
explain its reasoning justifying the suppression of fingerprint evidence, 
in the years following Davis and Hayes, lower courts have emphasized 
the investigatory nature of the fingerprint collection in those cases, 
thereby providing support for the distinction between an investigative and 
administrative purpose.93 Thus, the supposed “can never be suppressed” 
jurisdictions, in recognizing the suppression of fingerprints under Davis 
and Hayes, also recognize—albeit implicitly—the notion that identity 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112 (“[W]e distinguish between fingerprints that are 
obtained as a result of an unconstitutional governmental investigation and fingerprint evidence 
that is instead obtained merely as part of a routine booking procedure.”). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1185 n.4 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(distinguishing fingerprints collected for purposes of connecting defendants to serious, non-
identity-related crimes and citing Davis and Hayes); United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 
585–86 (6th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing fingerprints from one’s name and date and birth, and citing 
Davis and Hayes); see also Christian Rodriguez, A088 190 226 (B.I.A. June 18, 2013), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/150133888/Christian-Rodriguez-A088-190-226-BIA-June-18-2013 
(acknowledging that fingerprints taken for criminal investigation purposes can be suppressed).  
 92. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d at 585–86. 
 93. See, e.g., Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 231 (“We recognize that Hayes and Davis 
themselves do not articulate this rule. But in both cases the Supreme Court based its holding—
requiring suppression of the fingerprint evidence—on the undisputed fact that the police obtained 
the challenged fingerprints during investigation of a specific crime . . . .”); United States v. Ortiz-
Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 576 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It is established law under Hayes and Davis that 
if fingerprints are taken for investigatory purposes, they must be suppressed in a criminal trial.”); 
Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755 (noting that the police in both Davis and Hayes detained the 
suspect solely for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints); United States v. Ortiz-Gonzalbo, 946 F. 
Supp. 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that in both Davis and Hayes “the Court focused its 
attention squarely on the motive of the arresting officers to obtain fingerprints, and made it 
plain . . . that that motive rationalized its decision”). The Supreme Court in Hayes did state that 
the police detained the suspect for “investigative purposes.” Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 
(1985).  
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evidence collected for an investigatory purpose may be suppressed.  
In sum, framing the current debate on the suppression of identity 
evidence as a simple split between “can be suppressed” and “can never 
be suppressed” conceals more intricate questions in Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule doctrine. Moreover, the notion that questions 
surrounding the suppression of identity evidence are answered by clear-
cut rules obscures the observation that this area of the law contains a fact-
based standard that is subject to much interpretation, as will be evident 
when applying these terms to the context of immigration-related policing.  
II.  THE POLICING OF IMMIGRANT IDENTITY EVIDENCE 
Although the Supreme Court made its now-controversial “identity 
statement” in the context of addressing Lopez-Mendoza’s protest against 
his immigration proceedings, the contemporary judicial debate 
surrounding this statement has almost entirely taken place within the 
context of immigration-related criminal proceedings.94 Questions 
regarding the suppression of identity evidence have primarily arisen 
during federal prosecutions for the crime of illegal reentry into the United 
States following a prior deportation order.95 Consequently, the existing 
conversation about the suppression of identity evidence is actually a more 
narrow discussion regarding the collection of immigration-related 
identity evidence introduced in a criminal court. Even though one might 
think that immigration courts would be the appropriate setting for an 
analysis of immigration-specific questions, immigration judges at the 
trial and appellate level generally follow the approach of the circuit in 
which the individual court sits.96 As a result, immigration courts 
principally look to exclusionary rule doctrine as applied in the federal 
criminal context. A full analysis of these same questions is noticeably 
lacking in the specific context of the policing that underlies evidence 
introduced in civil immigration proceedings.97  
                                                                                                                     
 94. Only a handful of federal cases arose from an appeal of a civil removal proceeding. See, 
e.g., Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 2013); Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 
F.3d 19, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 95. See, e.g., Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1105; Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d at 582; see also 
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (statute prohibiting being present in the United States after prior removal 
order).  
 96. See, e.g., Jorge Hernandez-Calderon Elide Cruz-Azua, A200 672 287, 2014 WL 
2919262, at *1 (B.I.A. Apr. 29, 2014) (sitting in Charlotte, North Carolina, within the Fourth 
Circuit, and citing the Fourth Circuit’s Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 227–32, decision for proposition 
that “identity-related evidence obtained for an administrative purpose, such as a removal hearing, 
may not be suppressed”); see supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 97. To be clear, there has been a robust judicial debate regarding the meaning of the Lopez-
Mendoza identity statement and whether the Court intended to exclude from the suppression 
remedy all evidence related to identity or whether it was merely restating a jurisdictional principle. 
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A.  Immigrant Identity Evidence  
In applying the investigative versus administrative standard in the 
criminal context, courts often mention that if one were to apply this 
standard to evidence used in immigration proceedings, all identity 
evidence would be exempt from the suppression remedy.98 These courts 
assume that because the immigration proceeding is an administrative 
hearing, all evidence collected for use in this proceeding is necessarily 
collected with an administrative purpose.99 The Fourth Circuit, for 
example, rationalizes its holding that identity evidence can be suppressed 
in criminal court by stating that “[t]his emphasis on the criminal context 
in which the fingerprints were obtained, and the intended investigative 
purpose for which they were procured, at least suggests that fingerprints 
obtained for administrative purposes, and intended for use in an 
administrative process—like deportation—may escape suppression.”100 
In addition, courts sometimes equate the policing purpose of 
“identification” with an administrative purpose. For instance, the Ninth 
Circuit, although holding that identity evidence can be suppressed if 
collected for investigative purposes, contrasts this with evidence 
collected “solely to establish [the defendant’s] true identity.”101 This 
rationale renders much, if not all, identity evidence admissible in 
immigration proceedings because immigrant identity evidence is 
typically collected for purposes of establishing an individual’s identity.  
An examination of immigration policing today, however, illuminates 
the inaccuracies of judicial assumptions regarding identity evidence 
introduced in immigration proceedings. Labeling the collection of 
immigrant identity evidence as administrative in purpose is, in many 
                                                                                                                     
What this judicial conversation has not included, however, is the subsequent analysis of the 
application of the exclusionary rule when applied to identity evidence introduced in an 
immigration proceeding. The notable exception is the Second Circuit. See Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d 
at 647–50. 
 98. See, e.g., Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 231 (suggesting that identity evidence that would 
be suppressed in a criminal case would not be suppressed in a deportation proceeding); United 
States v. Mendoza-Carrillo, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (D.S.D. 2000) (reasoning that suppressing 
the challenged identity evidence in the criminal case “will not hamper the INS in civil deportation 
proceedings”). 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Plaza-Leon, No. CR-11-0098-TUC-DCB-DTF, 2011 WL 
3510944, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 15, 2011) (holding that the fingerprint evidence was admissible 
because it was “taken for the purpose of identifying [the defendant], in relation to an 
administrative immigration matter”). 
 100. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 231. The court went on to state that “[f]ingerprinting 
conducted as part of an arrest intended to lead only to an administrative deportation simply does 
not present the same concerns as the fingerprinting at issue in Hayes and Davis, which was meant 
to (and did in fact) lead to criminal prosecutions.” Id. 
 101. United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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cases, a mischaracterization of the nature and function of immigration-
related policing. Rather, as the analysis in Section II.B demonstrates, 
immigrant identity evidence is often collected with an investigative 
purpose, and as such, should be suppressed under operation of the 
exclusionary rule in immigration court. 
It is important to remember that this argument does not necessarily 
span the entirety of evidence introduced in immigration proceedings or 
address all forms of immigration policing. Just as one can imagine 
criminal evidence collected devoid of an investigative motive (e.g., drugs 
found in a pocket while being booked on drunk-driving charges), so too 
can one posit that there is some immigrant identity evidence collected for 
an administrative purpose (e.g., answers to routine questions posed at a 
typical port of entry). This Article necessarily limits its argument to 
evidentiary questions that are raised when applying exclusionary rule 
doctrine, that is, questions that follow a judicial finding of an egregious 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore helpful to keep in mind 
what police conduct might qualify as “egregious.”  
Although the circuits define “egregiousness” differently,102 broadly 
speaking, the offending police conduct typically reflects either the 
importance of the underlying constitutional value or the severity of the 
police conduct itself.103 Detaining an individual solely on the basis of her 
race or ethnicity is an egregious constitutional violation.104 The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, affirmed an immigration judge’s determination that 
a traffic stop was based solely on race when the law enforcement officer 
testified in part that he pulled over the driver because he “appeared to be 
Hispanic,” seemed to have a “dry” mouth, “was blinking,” and looked 
nervous.105 Additionally, courts will likely find that warrantless home 
raids constitute egregious violations.106 In one such case, armed ICE 
                                                                                                                     
 102. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 526–30 (reviewing circuits’ standards of egregiousness); 
Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1565, 1638–43 (2013) (discussing and comparing how different circuits approach and define 
egregiousness). 
 103. Many circuits consider “threats, coercion or physical abuse” to fall within the definition 
of egregiousness. See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing 
egregiousness in terms of involuntariness and coercion under the Fifth Amendment); see also 
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that a court finds 
egregiousness in part by evaluating the “characteristics and severity of the offending conduct”). 
 104. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1451–52 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
Border Patrol officers stopping Mario Gonzalez solely on the basis of his Hispanic appearance 
was an egregious constitutional violation); David Antonio Lara-Torres, A094 218 294, 2014 WL 
1120165, at *2 (B.I.A. Jan. 28, 2014) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment violation was egregious 
because it was based solely on race). 
 105. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1446. 
 106. See Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that a nighttime, 
warrantless home raid might constitute an egregious Fourth Amendment violation); Lopez-
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officers loudly pounded on a home’s windows and doors at four in the 
morning and then, without a warrant or consent, forcibly entered the 
home, placed the residents in handcuffs, and ordered them onto the 
floor.107 This type of police conduct exemplifies the factual context of 
exclusionary rule doctrine in immigration court, and provides the 
necessary facts for evaluating the underlying police purpose of the 
collection of identity evidence. 
B.  The Collection of Immigrant Identity Evidence 
This Article presents its analysis of immigration policing and the 
collection of immigrant identity evidence through the lens of 
exclusionary rule doctrine. When a court is confronted with suppressing 
any particular piece of identity evidence (whether the facts are contained 
within a police report, a database record, or a suspect’s own statements), 
the court applies exclusionary rule doctrine—an analysis that focuses on 
the type of evidence, the underlying purpose of collecting the evidence, 
and the manner in which officers collected the evidence.108 Depending on 
the nature of the evidence and when it came into the possession of law 
enforcement, different pieces of evidence raise different questions in 
exclusionary rule doctrine. Consequently, this Article structures its 
examination of immigrant policing into three categories that reflect 
distinct analytical strands and justifications for the admission of 
immigrant identity evidence. The three categories are: evidence collected 
post-unconstitutional police conduct (e.g., a statement made by the 
suspect); evidence collected prior to unconstitutional police conduct 
(e.g., a preexisting record in a government database); and evidence that 
exists concurrently with unconstitutional police conduct (e.g., a person’s 
name and date of birth). 
1.  Acquired Evidence of Identity 
Identity evidence collected by law enforcement after an egregious 
Fourth Amendment violation should not be deemed as administrative in 
purpose simply because of its eventual use in an administrative 
immigration proceeding. As explained below, due to the evolution of 
immigration enforcement, identity evidence today is often collected for 
an investigative purpose, and as such, that evidence should be subject to 
suppression under the exclusionary rule in immigration court. 
 
                                                                                                                     
Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding warrantless, forcible 
entry into home to be an egregious Fourth Amendment violation). 
 107. Cotzojay, 725 F.3d at 174. 
 108. See generally Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426–28 (2011) (discussing and 
applying the exclusionary rule).  
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Immigration policing historically lay in the hands of federal law 
enforcement and was conducted in a manner that intuitively seems more 
administrative in nature. An individual crossing a border, whether on land 
or via an airport, expects routine questions regarding where he came 
from, his legal permission to enter, and the purpose of his visit. The 
questioning of all who enter, the physical location of such questioning, 
and the use of trained immigration officers to ask these questions 
contributed to the sense of past immigration policing as a routine form of 
civil border protection. 
Over the past twenty years, however, state and local law enforcement 
have moved to the front lines of immigration policing, thereby drastically 
changing the means of enforcing federal immigration law.109 Local 
involvement has increased as a result of both formal and informal 
mechanisms. First, in 1996, Congress authorized state and local police 
officers to arrest for the federal crime of illegal reentry.110 Then, 
following September 11, 2001, formalized agreements for federal–state 
cooperation in immigration enforcement greatly increased in number.111 
Under agreements known as “287g memorandums,” the federal 
government delegated local police officers the formal authority to enforce 
federal immigration law.112 The federal government also created 
Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and 
Security (ACCESS), an umbrella of programs run by ICE to train and 
assist local police in conducting immigration enforcement.113 These 
programs were born in part from the recognition that “partnerships with 
state and local law enforcement agencies can leverage ICE’s enforcement 
capacity.”114 Additionally, over the last few years, several states have 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1130 (2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of 
Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1563, 1579 (2010). 
 110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252c(b) (2012); Wishnie, supra note 12, at 1098.  
 111. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the 
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 326 (2007). 
 112. Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, 
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g (last visited Oct. 12, 
2016). As of this printing, ICE has thirty-two such agreements with local law enforcement 
agencies from sixteen states. Id.   
 113. Id.  The 287g memorandums are one program under ICE ACCESS (Agreements of 
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security). Id.  
 114. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42057, 
INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 28 (2012), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42057.pdf (“Partnerships with state and local law 
enforcement agencies leverage ICE’s enforcement capacity because there are about 150 times 
more state and local law enforcement officers in the United States than there are ICE 
agents . . . .”). 
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passed laws requiring local law enforcement to assist in immigration 
enforcement.115 
In addition to formal cooperation at the front end of policing, the 
federal government has also mandated assistance with immigration 
enforcement at the “back end.” Launched in 2008, Secure Communities 
(S-Comm) required all local jails to share the fingerprints of those 
detained with federal immigration officers.116 Although ICE has 
discontinued S-Comm,117 under its replacement program, the Priority 
Enforcement Program (PEP), local law enforcement and federal 
immigration authorities will continue to share fingerprints and biometric 
data.118 Similarly, the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) works with local 
and state correctional facilities to identify incarcerated individuals who 
may be subject to deportation.119 These information-sharing programs 
directly connect local police—and those individuals they decide to detain 
and arrest—to the federal enforcement of civil immigration law. 
Even without a formal arrangement, a vast number of local police 
officers today participate in immigration enforcement to some extent. 
Under federal law, local police departments may “cooperate . . . in the 
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully 
present in the United States.”120 In many localities across the country, 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Arizona’s S.B. 1070 is perhaps the most well-known of these efforts, and despite the 
Supreme Court partially striking this statute down, the provision that allows local officers to 
question the immigration status of those they suspect are in the country illegally remains valid 
law. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012); see also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-9-1003 (West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170 (2015). 
 116. See Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2016); see also Margaret Hu, Big 
Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1743–44 (2015). S-Comm also included the use of 
“detainers”—a request by the federal government for the locality to hold the individual in custody 
until federal officers could pick up the individual. See Amelia Fischer, Secure Communities, 
Racial Profiling, & Suppression Law in Removal Proceedings, 19 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 63, 66 
(2013). 
 117. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), http:// 
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf (directing 
the discontinuation of S-Comm). 
 118. Id. at 2–3. 
 119. See Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Oct. 12, 2016); NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
PROJECT, PUSHING BACK ON ICE ENFORCEMENT INSIDE LOCAL JAILS 1 (2013), 
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/cap_advocacy_guide.pdf. 
 120. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2012); see also United States v. Ovando-Garza, 752 F.3d 
1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the officer did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop 
because the officer had the authority under § 1357(g)(10) to investigate whether the driver was 
unlawfully present in the U.S., to communicate with Border Patrol, and to detain the driver until 
Border Patrol arrived). 
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local police departments have informal working relationships with the 
regional ICE or Border Patrol office and often voluntarily, and without 
express directive, notify immigration authorities after detaining someone 
who they believe is a noncitizen without legal status.121 In addition, the 
federal government provides localities with some financial 
“reimbursement” for the costs of incarcerating noncitizens.122 Although 
the federal government does not require any particular level of 
cooperation, the fact that it reimburses states for costs they already may 
incur (such as for correctional officer salary and the costs of detaining a 
noncitizen with a pending state criminal matter) provides a financial 
incentive for local officers to inquire about the immigration status of 
those stopped and detained.123  
Certainly, the evolution of immigration enforcement is not simply 
limited to the addition of local actors. Federal immigration officers have 
also moved from routine patrols at the borders to individualized policing 
tactics in the interior, including traffic stops and home and workplace 
raids.124 But in large part because of the growth of local law 
enforcement’s participation, the overall nature of immigration policing 
has changed, and consequently, so too has the factual context in which 
law enforcement initially learns of an individual’s identity and obtains 
identity-related evidence. As a result of local law enforcement’s 
involvement in immigration enforcement, it is now more often state or 
local police officers, during the course of their day-to-day policing, who 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. REV. 277, 332 (2013) 
(presenting data that state and local police referrals increased from 5.4% of all ICE criminal cases 
in 2004 to 10% by 2009 and that last year, more than 46,000 federal criminal immigration cases 
were a result of state and local referrals); id. at 327 n.387 (listing instances of local law 
enforcement participating in immigration enforcement); Monica Varsanyi et al., Immigration 
Federalism: Which Policy Prevails?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-federalism-which-policy-prevails (giving 
the results of a nationwide study of local law enforcement agencies and noting that over twenty-
seven percent of county sheriffs would check immigration status, call ICE if they encountered a 
noncitizen during a traffic violation stop, or both).  
 122. In fiscal year 2013, the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), a federal 
program that reimburses localities for the costs of incarcerating noncitizens, distributed over $213 
million to 897 jurisdictions. See Fiscal Year of 2013 SCAAP Award List, BUREAU OF JUST. 
ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=86 (select the “Archives” 
tab, follow the “FY 2013 SCAAP Award List” hyperlink, and download the spreadsheet). 
 123. See Malhotra, supra note 121, at 332–33. The majority of jurisdictions that participate 
in SCAAP report that they ask all arrestees about their immigration status. Id. at 330. 
 124. See, e.g., Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2013) (home raid by ICE 
officers); Eric Rey Cruz Cruz, A098 430 020, 2012 WL 3911826, at *1 (B.I.A. Aug. 22, 2012) 
(ICE operation targeting gang members at a nightclub). 
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encounter noncitizens and investigate immigration status and identity.125  
Envision again the following scenario: A local police officer, driving 
along a highway, pulls over an individual driving a car. Assume that the 
traffic stop was an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment—the 
officer stopped the driver solely on the basis of his race. After stopping 
the driver, the officer questions the driver, asking him his name, date of 
birth, and immigration status. The driver states that he is from El Salvador 
and is not an U.S. citizen. The officer memorializes these admissions in 
a police report, which ICE later copies onto a similar report.126 
Ultimately, the driver is placed in removal proceedings, and the 
government seeks to admit these admissions into evidence.127 
With respect to the exclusionary rule analysis, courts consider these 
identity-related admissions evidence acquired after the egregious Fourth 
Amendment violation. Other identity evidence in this category includes 
a suspect’s fingerprints, evidence later obtained from foreign 
governments (e.g., a birth certificate), and evidence obtained from a 
search of the suspect’s person (e.g., a foreign identification card). In 
general, the suppression of evidence acquired by the government 
following unconstitutional police conduct is analyzed according to 
traditional exclusionary rule principles—the well-established “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” analysis. But, as stated previously, when identity 
evidence is at issue, the court then applies the investigative versus 
administrative standard128 and must focus on the motive of the officer at 
the time of the evidence collection. 
The collection of identity evidence for an immigration-related 
investigation does not automatically render the evidence collection 
administrative in its purpose. Criminal courts have occasionally 
                                                                                                                     
 125. State and local officers now arrest four times more immigrants referred for removal 
hearings than federal officers. Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 183 (2013), 
http://columbialawreview.org/policing-the-immigration-police_cade. See, e.g., Roger Nigel 
Ramjattan, A087 546 017, 2014 WL 3795454, at *1 (B.I.A. June 13, 2014) (stating that a New 
York State trooper pulled over respondent and then called Border Patrol); Efrain Moralez-
Palillero, A087 779 440, 2014 WL 3697662, at *1 (B.I.A. Apr. 30, 2014) (noting that the Camden 
Police Department arrested the respondent for a traffic violation and then took respondent into 
custody where DHS interviewed him). 
 126. A noncitizen’s immigration-related statements are often memorialized in a Form I-213 
(Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien). See Patricia J. Schofield, Note, Evidence in 
Deportation Proceedings, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1537, 1565 (1985). A Form I-213 is the document the 
immigration enforcement officer fills in with a noncitizen’s personal information, immigration 
record, any statements made, and any further investigation undertaken. Id. It is, in general terms, 
the immigration court version of a police report. 
 127. For a similar fact pattern, see Jose Alfredo Fonseca-Velasquez, A200 586 281, 2014 
WL 1278449, at *1 (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2014).   
 128. See supra text accompanying note 89.  
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recognized that an officer collecting immigrant identity evidence may act 
with an investigative purpose.129 For instance, in United States v. 
Guevara-Martinez,130 two city police officers stopped the defendant, 
arrested him, and, suspecting he was not in the country legally, informed 
the federal immigration authorities (at the time called the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS)).131 The federal immigration officer 
arrived the next day at the local jail and fingerprinted Martin Guevara-
Martinez.132 Eventually Guevara-Martinez was indicted for a criminal 
immigration offense.133 Following the district court’s determination that 
the initial arrest by the city police officers was unlawful, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the suppression of the fingerprint evidence, in part due 
to “[t]he absence of evidence that the fingerprinting resulted from routine 
booking” and the logical inference that the officer took the fingerprints 
“for the purpose of assisting the INS investigation.”134  
Under current judicial thinking, however, the above analysis of 
individual officer motive would change if the exclusionary rule question 
was presented in the context of an administrative removal proceeding. 
Courts most often define an “investigative” purpose as one in which the 
police are investigating a criminal offense.135 But many courts take a leap 
of logic and conclude that if no criminal charges result from the initial 
police stop, and only deportation occurs, the underlying police motive 
could not have been an investigative one.136  
There is no support, in doctrine or practice, for the notion that the 
proceeding in which the evidence ultimately appears determines the 
initial purpose of the evidence collection. First, from a purely common 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Border Patrol 
officer had an investigative motive after an unlawful arrest and subsequent fingerprinting of the 
defendant); United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the 
suppression of fingerprints taken in part because police collected them “for the purpose of 
assisting the [ICE] investigation” (quoting United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 756 
(8th Cir. 2001))). 
 130. 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001).  
 131. Id. at 752. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (8 U.S.C. § 1326 violation). 
 134. Id. at 755–57 (stating that the officers “obtained Guevara-Martinez’s fingerprints by 
exploiting his unlawful detention, instead of by means sufficient to have purged the taint of the 
initial illegality”). At the time of this case, INS was the federal agency responsible for the 
enforcement of federal immigration law.  
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining 
investigative purpose as one aimed at connecting the defendant to “alleged criminal activity”); 
see also supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (elaborating on the definition of an 
“investigative” purpose). 
 136. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.   
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sense standpoint, if the legal forum controlled the determination of police 
motive, then courts would deem all pieces of evidence introduced in a 
criminal court to have an investigative purpose. Such an analysis, 
however, would negate the administrative label given to evidence 
collected during routine booking procedures—a result with no support in 
current exclusionary rule doctrine. Therefore, it cannot be that all 
evidence collected after unconstitutional police conduct is collected for 
an administrative purpose simply because the evidence ultimately 
appears in an administrative immigration proceeding. 
Second, the investigative versus administrative standard is specific in 
its time frame—the analysis considers the officer’s purpose at the 
moment of the evidence collection.137 As a practical matter, it is difficult 
to argue that the ultimate forum directly corresponds with the officer’s 
purpose because, in the context of a traffic stop today, the officer likely 
does not know whether a criminal or civil prosecution will result.138 At 
the time of the collection of most identity evidence, it is virtually 
impossible to know whether the investigation will result in a criminal 
charge—perhaps for unlawful entry or unlawful reentry after 
deportation—or merely a civil violation for being unlawfully present in 
the United States.139 It is inaccurate, therefore, to assume that a later 
administrative proceeding necessarily signifies an earlier administrative 
purpose in evidence collection.  
Furthermore, state and local officers often have an investigative 
purpose at the time of the collection of immigrant identity evidence due 
to current law governing immigration policing. Generally under federal 
law, state and local police may not stop or arrest an individual based 
solely on suspicion of a violation of federal civil immigration law.140 It 
is, however, generally acceptable for local authorities to investigate 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d at 867 (distinguishing between the admissibility of fingerprint 
exemplars based on their purpose at the time the prints were taken).   
 138. Compare In re Jose Alfredo Fonseca-Velasquez, A200 586 281, 2014 WL 1278449 
(B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2014) (recognizing that the traffic stop led to civil removal proceedings), with 
United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 613 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the traffic 
stop led to an immigration-related criminal prosecution). 
 139. See Re, supra note 12, at 1939 (noting that civil immigration proceedings often arise 
from investigations undertaken with an eye toward possible criminal charges). 
 140. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012); Assistance by State and 
Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. O.L.C. 26, 26 (1996) (“State and local police 
lack recognized legal authority to stop and detain an alien solely on suspicion of civil 
deportability, as opposed to a criminal violation of the immigration laws or other laws.”). The 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that being present in the United States is a civil violation, not 
a criminal one. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (“[I]t is not a crime for a removable alien to remain 
present in the United States.”). The caveat to this statement is if the locality has a formal 
agreement with the federal government to assist in civil immigration enforcement. See supra note 
112 and accompanying text (describing 287(g) agreements). 
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federal criminal immigration offenses in addition to investigating other 
state and federal crimes.141 Furthermore, although federal law permits the 
police to ask questions related to immigration status, these questions must 
be within the confines of a constitutional detention based on a traffic 
violation or an investigation of a criminal offense.142 In short, because 
there are only limited circumstances in which local police have the legal 
authority to conduct civil immigration enforcement, the police ask many 
of the questions that elicit immigrant identity evidence as part of an initial 
investigation into a criminal offense.143  
A consideration of current immigration policing in practice also 
supports the conclusion that police no longer only collect immigrant 
identity evidence during “routine” and administrative procedures.144 As 
mentioned earlier, the involvement of state and local law enforcement 
officers means the very nature of immigration enforcement has 
changed.145 The means of policing are often more focused on a specific 
individual compared to the more standardized practices of border 
checkpoints and airport screenings. The police now ask immigration-
related identity questions during an individually targeted investigative 
tactic, such as a home raid or traffic stop—tactics more akin to a criminal 
investigation of a particular person or specific crime.146 Furthermore, in 
the context of the immigrant identity evidence at issue here, the individual 
being questioned will, by the very nature of the prerequisite finding of 
egregious police conduct, be subject to police conduct that is by definition 
less standard, routine, and administrative. 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, supra note 
140 (“Subject to the provisions of state law, state and local police may constitutionally detain or 
arrest aliens for violating the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.”); 
Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona 
v. United States, 9 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 21 (2013) (noting that most courts and 
scholars accept that local police have the authority to arrest for federal criminal violations); Santos 
v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (same).  
 142. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (noting that an immigration status check within a lawful 
detention would likely survive preemption); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (holding 
that since questions regarding immigration status did not unconstitutionally prolong the detention, 
there was no additional Fourth Amendment justification required for such questioning). 
 143. Admittedly, it is difficult to determine whether an investigative or administrative 
purpose motivates in and of itself any specific identity-related question. But it is this very 
difficulty that ultimately supports the rejection of the administrative label for all immigrant 
identity evidence. See infra Part III. 
 144. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (defining “administrative” in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine). 
 145. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.  
 146. See Kate Linthicum, Spurned by Local Law Enforcement, ICE Stages Elaborate 
Immigration Raids, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/politics/la-me-immigrant-arrests-20150815-story.html.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732009
848 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
One potential complication in exclusionary rule doctrine in this 
context is the fact that the evidence initially collected by local or state 
police is handed over (or in the case of identifying information, is 
repeated) to federal immigration officials. Some courts—but not all—
have refused to consider the unlawful conduct of state police officers 
when determining whether the law prevents the federal government from 
using such evidence in an immigration proceeding.147 These courts reason 
that any deterrent effect on local police officers from the suppression of 
evidence in immigration court would be “highly attenuated.”148 Although 
outside of the scope of this Article to consider fully, criminal law scholar 
David Gray and others have critiqued this view as resurrecting the “silver 
platter” doctrine, a doctrine that has been resoundingly rejected in the 
criminal context between federal and state actors.149 In the years 
following the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment to the states in 
1949,150 it was still permissible for federal officials to introduce evidence 
in federal court that state police officers illegally seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.151 At the time, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
“it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state 
authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter.”152 
The Court later repudiated this doctrine in Elkins v. United States153 and 
acknowledged that the silver platter doctrine incentivized 
unconstitutional state police conduct.154 As Professor Gray points out, 
this exact same reasoning should apply in the context of immigration 
enforcement today.155 In light of the close relationship between federal 
and state officers in immigration policing, an exclusionary rule doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See Alejandro Hernandez-Morales, A200 618 026, 2013 WL 6269374, at *2 (B.I.A. 
Nov. 6, 2013) (stating that DHS had no role in the initial unlawful arrest, and therefore the judge 
must consider whether to hold any evidence obtained by DHS as fruit of the poisonous tree). But 
see Jairo Ferino Sanchez, A094 216 521, 2014 WL 3889481, at *1 (B.I.A. July 11, 2014) (holding 
that in determining whether to suppress evidence ultimately collected by DHS officers, the 
immigration judge must first assess the constitutionality of the initial seizure by local police as 
“the subsequent immigration questioning flows directly from the respondent’s initial stop and 
arrest”). 
 148. Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 149. See Gray, supra note 12, at 15, 35; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S 206, 208–
14 (1960) (discussing the history of the exclusionary rule and the silver platter doctrine). 
 150. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). 
 151. See Gray, supra note 12, at 11–13. Federal officials could use this illegally seized 
evidence so long as they did not direct, or have knowledge of, the state officers’ actions. See id. 
at 11. 
 152. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949). 
 153. 364 U.S 206 (1960).  
 154. Id. at 217, 221–24; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (“[N]o man is to 
be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.”). 
 155. See Gray, supra note 12, at 36. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732009
2016] POLICING THE IMMIGRANT IDENTITY 849 
 
in immigration court that would automatically permit federal officials to 
introduce evidence illegally seized by state and local officers undermines 
the primary deterrent function of the exclusionary rule and encourages 
the disregard of the Fourth Amendment by both federal and local law 
enforcement.156 
In sum, the collection of identity evidence by local police officers after 
an egregious Fourth Amendment violation should not automatically be 
deemed administrative in purpose simply because of its eventual use in a 
deportation proceeding. Rather, police officers may collect immigrant 
identity evidence with an investigative purpose, and, if so motivated, the 
evidence should be subject to suppression under application of the 
exclusionary rule, even when introduced in immigration court. 
2.  Preexisting Evidence of Identity 
Identity evidence introduced into immigration proceedings also falls 
into a second evidentiary category of analysis: evidence that is lawfully 
in the hands of the government prior to the unconstitutional police 
conduct. This is often referred to in exclusionary rule jurisprudence as 
preexisting evidence.157 In today’s world of law enforcement, and 
particularly in the world of immigration enforcement, this evidence is 
most often in the form of a database record. For example, a database 
record containing a person’s name, date of birth, country of origin, and 
immigration status may already be in the government’s possession 
because she has been previously arrested, sought a travel visa at a foreign 
consular office, or applied for a state identification card. Once the 
individual faces deportation, the government seeks to introduce this 
preexisting database record in the immigration proceeding.158 
Over the past twenty years, the federal government has established 
and expanded databases that gather domestic and international data on 
millions of individuals.159 The main identity-related database of the 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Professor Gray advances his critique of the creation of a “contemporary silver platter 
doctrine” based on the lack of a generally applicable exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings. See id. at 31–33. 
 157. Sophia Lin Lakin, Argumentative Preview Exclusionary Rule and Identity-Related 
Documents, SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/03/argument-previ 
ew-does-the-exclusionary-rule-apply-to-pre-existing-identity-related-governmental-documents/.  
 158. See, e.g., In re David Antonio Lara-Torres, A094 218 294, 2014 WL 1120165, at *2 
(B.I.A. Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the government’s evidence including records from the 
Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration). 
 159. The databases discussed above are not a complete list. In addition to the ones discussed 
above, other national databases include CODIS (the Combined DNA Index System) and E-Verify 
(a federal employment eligibility verification system). There are over 2000 databases maintained 
by federal agencies and departments. See Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC), contains millions of criminal history records from state 
criminal justice systems, including “rap sheets,” missing person reports, 
and protection orders.160 In 2001, Congress authorized the expansion of 
NCIC to include civil immigration records.161 The Department of 
Homeland Security also maintains its own database, the Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which contains biographic 
and biometric records on over 148 million individuals, including 
individuals who have had contact with their agency or another 
immigration-related office such as a consulate or embassy.162  
The expansion of data collection has not been limited to immigration 
and criminal records alone. The FBI maintains the Next Generation 
Identification system (NGI), a database of fingerprints that includes not 
only prints of individuals who have passed through the criminal justice 
system but also “civil fingerprints”—fingerprints of individuals who 
have served in the military or have worked for the federal government.163 
The FBI is currently expanding its database system to include data 
gathered from commercial databases, social networking platforms, and 
private employers.164 Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 
now work together to gather records from a variety of private and public 
sources including agriculture, banking, retail, real estate, health services, 
and motor vehicle records.165  
 
                                                                                                                     
Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 809 (2010). For a history of the rise of the use 
of databases in the criminal justice system, see id. at 805–10. 
 160. See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of 
Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1124 (2013); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Electronic Privacy Information Center and Legal Scholars and Technical Experts in Support of 
the Petitioner at 8, Tolentino v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 1387 (2011) (No. 09-11556) [hereinafter 
EPIC Tolentino Brief]. 
 161. Kalhan, supra note 160, at 1124–25. 
 162. Id. at 1127. IDENT contains digital fingerprints, iris scans, facial images, photographs, 
and biographic information. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
FOR THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 2 (2012), 
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_appendixj
_jan2013.pdf. 
 163. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION (NGI) MONTHLY 
FACT SHEET (2016), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ngi-monthly-fact-sheet/view. The “civil 
file” contains over 50 million individuals. Id. 
 164. Kalhan, supra note 160, at 1133. 
 165. See EPIC Tolentino Brief, supra note 160, at 13–17 (describing the development of 
national and local “fusion centers” that will collect data from a wide variety of organizations and 
government offices as well as provide such data to state and local law enforcement); see also State 
and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (last visited Oct. 12, 2016) 
(providing general information on state and major urban area fusion centers).  
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The collection of personal data has grown in tandem with increased 
accessibility of these federal databases to state and local law enforcement. 
For instance, the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), formed in 
1994, is a federal clearinghouse that local police officers can call twenty-
four hours a day to run a suspect through international and national 
databases, including IDENT and NCIC.166 A database inquiry is a routine 
part of the booking process and, due to advances in technology, may also 
occur even earlier at the initial traffic stop or moment of detention. 
Products for officers to carry in their hands and in their patrol cars, such 
as mobile fingerprint devices, iris scanners, and facial recognition 
cameras, are now readily available and linked to state and federal 
databases.167 In short, twenty-four hours a day, from essentially any 
location and before any arrest, the police have access to a vast amount of 
personal and identifying information. 
The growth of database policing has changed the very nature of 
immigration policing. Today’s immigration enforcement regime is, in the 
words of immigration scholar Anil Kalhan, one of “automated 
immigration policing.”168 Local police access LESC over a million times 
per year, and in fiscal year 2013, local law enforcement contacted 
deportation specialists at the clearinghouse over 150,000 times.169 NCIC, 
which contains civil immigration records and more than 300,000 records 
from ICE, conducts an average of 12 million transactions per day with 
law enforcement.170  
Moreover, the increased involvement of state and local police in 
federal immigration enforcement, combined with the rise of more-
accessible and expansive database systems, puts the search for 
immigration-related identity evidence at the front lines of local 
policing.171 Determining an individual’s immigration status or country of 
origin is no longer an investigation only conducted later in time, at an 
administrative hearing or by a federal immigration officer. Rather, in 
immigration policing today, a local police officer often collects such 
identifying information through a quick phone call or computer search 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Kalhan, supra note 160, at 1117; see also Murphy, supra note 159, at 808 (discussing 
the rise of searching and sharing database functions post-1999). 
 167. See Kalhan, supra note 160, at 1133; EPIC Tolentino Brief, supra note 160, at 6–7. 
 168. Kalhan, supra note 160, at 1109 (stating that “automated immigration 
policing . . . renders immigration status visible, accessible, . . . and subject to routine monitoring 
and screening by a wide range of public and private actors”). 
 169. Law Enforcement Support Center, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.ice.gov/lesc/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 170. Id.; National Crime Enforcement Center, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 171. Databases also play a significant role in contemporary policing more generally. See 
Murphy, supra note 159, at 836. 
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during a traffic stop. According to the LESC website, “The primary users 
of the center are state and local law enforcement officers seeking 
information regarding aliens encountered in the course of their daily 
enforcement activities.”172  
Determining the exclusionary rule’s application to evidence acquired 
after unconstitutional police conduct typically focuses on questions of 
taint and attenuation. But in the case of preexisting government records, 
because the government has the information stored in a database prior to 
the unreasonable search or seizure, courts often find that the “independent 
source exception” applies to the records’ suppression.173 In general, the 
exclusionary rule “does not reach backward to taint information that was 
in official hands prior to any illegality.”174  
Taken at face value, the idea that the exclusionary rule can never reach 
backward would appear to categorically protect any preexisting evidence 
from the application of the exclusionary rule. Courts would therefore 
always deem a government database record “independent” and not 
subject to suppression. But the rationale underlying why a particular 
piece of evidence is deemed sufficiently independent or already in the 
government’s possession under exclusionary rule doctrine, as developed 
in the criminal context, does not justify this same conclusion when 
analyzing the role of the government database record in immigration 
policing today.  
Although the database record is technically already in the 
government’s hands writ large, the record is not, in any meaningful sense, 
knowledge that is already part of the police investigation. Exclusionary 
rule doctrine has always placed more weight on the officer’s actual 
knowledge, as opposed to his potential knowledge, at the time of the 
Fourth Amendment violation.175 This jurisprudence also focuses on the 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Law Enforcement Support Center, supra note 169. 
 173. See, e.g., In re Sanchez, A076 359 028, 2014 WL 3697757, at *2 (B.I.A. May 27, 2014) 
(stating that the respondent’s application for Family Unity Benefits and Employment 
Authorization was independent evidence of alienage); In re Cruz, A098 430 020, 2012 WL 
3911826, at *4 n.2 (B.I.A. Aug. 22, 2012) (agreeing that the respondent’s DMV record was 
independent evidence); see also Fischer, supra note 116, at 79 (documenting cases in which the 
government argued for the admission of the proof of alienage already in the government’s 
possession based on the independent source exception). Of course, this reasoning does not appear 
only in immigration cases. See, e.g., People v. Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (N.Y. 2010) 
(affirming the lower court holding that DMV records were admissible in part because they were 
“public records already in the possession of authorities”). 
 174. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475 (1980). 
 175. In Crews, the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s photograph taken by the police 
following his unlawful arrest was not subject to suppression because the police knew the 
defendant’s identity prior to the unlawful arrest. 445 U.S. at 475. The Court emphasized that, prior 
to the unlawful detention, the police were already actively investigating the defendant as a suspect 
in the very crimes for which he was later unlawfully detained. Id. The Court explicitly did not 
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knowledge of the individual officers themselves, rather than allowing a 
conception of “law enforcement” that encompasses any and all 
government officials.176 In many immigration-related investigations 
today, the local police officer has no actual knowledge of the suspect’s 
identity or the database record at the time of his unlawful conduct.177 
Moreover, the officer would never have searched for the database record 
without first gaining the unlawful knowledge of, at the very least, a 
person’s name and date of birth.  
In addition, viewing all database evidence as sufficiently in “official 
hands” so as to establish independence would provide perverse incentives 
for local officers to violate the Fourth Amendment. It is not hard to 
envision a modified “silver platter doctrine”178 developing—a local 
officer purposefully commits an egregious violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, stopping a person solely on the basis of his race, knowing 
that although a court may suppress any evidence collected after the stop, 
the vast world of government database records would remain admissible. 
Considering the continued expansion of such databases,179 the enticement 
to violate the Fourth Amendment (given the ever-increasing likelihood of 
discovering an individual in at least one database) will only grow over 
time. Thus, a doctrine that considered any government database record 
part of law enforcement’s knowledge at the time of the unconstitutional 
conduct loses the important focus on whether the officer exploits the 
initial illegal conduct to uncover evidence and, more fundamentally, 
weakens the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule itself. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that a court deems the database 
record not in law enforcement’s possession, a court might still view the 
search for the database record as sufficiently independent of, or 
attenuated from, the unconstitutional police conduct. But this contention 
falls short as well when analyzing the underlying logic of the independent 
source exception. As established in Segura v. United States180 and 
                                                                                                                     
address a case in which “routine investigatory procedures would eventually have led the police to 
discover respondent’s culpability.” Id. at 475 n.22. In Hudson v. Michigan, the Court, in holding 
that a violation of the knock and announce requirement did not merit applying the exclusionary 
rule, noted that the police had a lawful search warrant at the time of the unlawful entry. 547 U.S. 
586, 592 (2006). Similarly, in New York v. Harris, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did 
not apply to a suspect’s statement made at the police station following an unlawful arrest in his 
home in part because the officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect at the time of his 
unlawful arrest. 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990). 
 176. See supra note 175. 
 177. See Gray, supra note 12, at 23–24.  
 178. See supra notes 149–55 (discussing the silver platter doctrine). 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 155–65.  
 180. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).  
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Murray v. United States,181 there are two general fact patterns considered 
to be within the scope of the independent source doctrine.182 In Segura, 
the police unlawfully searched the defendant’s apartment but waited in 
the apartment until they obtained a valid search warrant the next day.183 
The Supreme Court held that the evidence newly found during the 
execution of the warrant was admissible because the police discovered it 
based on an “independent source.”184 The Segura fact pattern can be 
described generally as follows: knowledge learned from the unlawful 
search (facts X and Y) is inadmissible, but knowledge gained from the 
lawful search (fact Z) is independently obtained and therefore 
admissible.185 In Murray, the police unlawfully entered a warehouse and 
observed wrapped bundles, which they suspected contained marijuana.186 
The police then applied for a search warrant, without mentioning their 
prior unlawful entry or the observation of these suspicious bundles.187 
The police returned to the warehouse with the valid warrant and seized 
what turned out to be large amounts of marijuana.188 In this fact pattern, 
although the police initially saw the wrapped bundles (fact Z) unlawfully, 
because they were able to obtain the same knowledge by independent 
means—the lawful search warrant—fact Z then became admissible.189  
Despite the different fact patterns, in both cases there was independent 
lawful knowledge that led to the learning of fact Z, thus rendering fact Z 
admissible. In Segura, the warrant was based on information completely 
separate from the facts learned from the unlawful search.190 In Murray, 
although the police first saw the bundles of marijuana unlawfully, they 
apparently had sufficient independent and previously held information 
that justified the obtaining of a warrant.191 Indeed, the Murray Court 
noted that the analysis would have changed “if the agents’ decision to 
                                                                                                                     
 181. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).  
 182. These cases are the preeminent cases on the independent source doctrine. See RONALD 
JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 694 (3d ed. 2011); STEPHEN A. 
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 572 (9th ed. 2010).   
 183. Segura, 468 U.S. at 798, 801. 
 184. Id. at 814. The government conceded, and the Court agreed, that evidence initially 
observed during the unlawful search was inadmissible. Id. at 798. 
 185. Murray, 487 U.S. at 538. 
 186. Id. at 535. 
 187. Id. at 535–36. 
 188. Id. at 536. 
 189. Id. at 538. 
 190. 468 U.S. at 814 (“None of the information on which the warrant was secured was 
derived from or related in any way to the initial entry into petitioners’ apartment; the information 
came from sources wholly unconnected with the entry and was known to the agents well before 
the initial entry.”). 
 191. 487 U.S. at 542–44 (remanding to the lower courts to determine whether the warrant-
authorized search was an independent source). 
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seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial 
entry.”192 Thus, under current exclusionary rule doctrine, the unlawful 
knowledge gained must play no part in the justification for the ultimate 
collection of the evidence.  
In immigration policing today, there is often no independent 
knowledge that justifies the obtaining of the government database record. 
An analysis of the fact pattern of today’s prototypical egregious police 
conduct (i.e., a race-based traffic stop) and the subsequent database 
search does not fit under either conception of the independent source 
exception. In fact, it is exactly the situation the Murray Court proscribed: 
the officer’s unlawful knowledge—illegally stopping the car and learning 
the driver’s identity—prompts him to search and collect the database 
record.193 Stated another way, in the case of this type of traffic stop, no 
independent facts provide a basis for the officer to search the database 
and acquire knowledge of the database record (fact Z). The only point of 
knowledge of the suspect’s identity is the unlawful conduct (fact X). 
There is no independent or untainted source of evidence that justifies the 
database search for evidence. This conclusion does not put the police in 
a “worse” place than they were prior to the unlawful stop—the database 
records exist for future use following lawful police conduct.194 
Having suggested that the independent source exception should not 
automatically apply to preexisting government database records collected 
after egregious Fourth Amendment violations, the question remains 
whether the database record constitutes identity evidence that should be 
subject to the exclusionary rule. In this respect, the analysis is the same 
as that to which all identity evidence is now subject: did the police collect 
the evidence, that is, did they search the database for an investigative or 
administrative purpose?   
Today, a database search is a ubiquitous tool of policing. There may 
be cases in which the search for preexisting database records occurs after 
the unconstitutional conduct but was undertaken for an administrative 
purpose (e.g., a routine database search for outstanding warrants 
conducted during booking). However, there are also clear instances in 
which the police search a database to investigate a particular crime. In the 
context of an egregious Fourth Amendment violation leading to a civil 
immigration proceeding, the database record containing identity evidence 
is often collected with an investigative purpose.195 Return again to this 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Id. at 542–43 (“[W]e can be absolutely certain that the warrantless entry in no way 
contributed in the slightest either to the issuance of a warrant or to the discovery of the evidence 
during the lawful search that occurred pursuant to the warrant.” (quoting United States v. 
Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 603 (1st Cir. 1985))). 
 193. Id. at 536–37.  
 194. Id. at 537.  
 195. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.  
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factual scenario: a local law enforcement officer, without legal authority 
to do so, stops an individual and eventually turns that individual over to 
ICE for removal. Prior to the unlawful arrest, the individual was not 
known to the police, or at the very least, was not the focus of the police’s 
lawful and knowing attention. In this instance, when the police conduct 
the database search, their motive is an investigative one—it is specifically 
to collect identity evidence to potentially connect this individual to an 
immigration-related criminal offense. As such, it remains tainted by the 
egregious constitutional violation and should be suppressed under 
operation of the exclusionary rule. 
In the immigration context, the administrative need to accurately 
identify an individual and the investigative purpose in connecting an 
individual to an immigration-related offense collide. Although evidence 
collected for both purposes may be suppressed under current 
exclusionary rule doctrine,196 the conceptual difficulty in determining, or 
disaggregating, the purpose of the immigration-related database search 
underscores the fact that the terms “investigative” and “administrative” 
are no longer helpful and may be misleading in guiding the suppression 
outcome in immigration court.197  
3.  Evidence of Identity 
A third form of identity evidence introduced in removal proceedings 
is the noncitizen’s name and date of birth. Although a person’s name and 
date of birth can sometimes be considered evidence acquired after the 
unconstitutional police conduct, and sometimes thought of as evidence 
already lawfully in the government’s possession, questions surrounding 
the suppression of a person’s name and date of birth occupy a somewhat 
unique position in exclusionary rule jurisprudence.  
Consider again the hypothetical: after pulling over a driver on the 
basis of his race, the police officer asks the driver his name and date of 
birth. After the driver also admits he was born in Mexico and does not 
have legal permission to be in the United States, the officer calls ICE, and 
the individual is eventually placed in removal proceedings. Imagine now 
that the immigration judge has suppressed the driver’s statements 
regarding his country of origin and immigration status. The judge has also 
ruled that any database records that the government gained using 
knowledge of the driver’s country of origin are inadmissible. But the 
judge holds that the driver’s name and date of birth are not subject to the 
exclusionary rule. As a result, if the government can demonstrate that its 
evidence was collected only on the basis of knowing the driver’s name 
                                                                                                                     
 196. See infra note 251. 
 197. See infra Part III (suggesting that courts discard these labels in the immigration context). 
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and date of birth, then such evidence would be admissible. 
This scenario is a realistic one. Both “can be suppressed” jurisdictions 
and “can never be suppressed” jurisdictions have held that an individual’s 
name and date of birth are not suppressible under the exclusionary rule.198 
This exemption is grounded, at least in part, in the jurisdictional principle 
that a Fourth Amendment violation does not divest a court of jurisdiction 
over a defendant.199 As explained recently by the Oregon Supreme Court,  
That principle has unavoidable evidentiary consequences for 
the application of the exclusionary rule: An individual 
cannot escape a tribunal’s power over his or her 
“body” . . . despite being subject to an illegal seizure; in that 
respect, the person’s “identity” is not subject to suppression 
on a purely practical level.200 
Using this line of reasoning, courts have held that, like one’s body, an 
individual’s name and date of birth are part of one’s “identity” necessary 
for establishing jurisdiction and therefore are categorically exempt from 
the exclusionary rule remedy.201  
The categorical removal of a person’s name and date of birth from the 
suppression remedy has important evidentiary outcomes. According to 
this line of thinking, evidence collected as a result of knowing an 
individual’s name and date of birth is gathered “independently” since it 
was found only by using evidence that is not subject to suppression.202 
Thus, the categorical exemption of a person’s name and date of birth 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Compare Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 650 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that although 
identity evidence is suppressible, name and date of birth are jurisdictional identity evidence which 
may not be), with United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 585, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that identity evidence is not suppressible in a case in which the defendant sought to suppress his 
name and date of birth). 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing the Ker–Frisbie doctrine). This is a 
narrow doctrinal justification for holding that a court cannot suppress a name and date of birth. A 
broader justification would simply be that no identity evidence, including a name and date of 
birth, is suppressible under the exclusionary rule. 
 200. State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702, 712 (Or. 2014) (en banc); see also Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d 
at 650 (“Lopez-Mendoza’s jurisdictional rule has unavoidable, practical evidentiary 
consequences.”). 
 201. See supra note 198. 
 202. See, e.g., Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 646 (“In the instant case, the BIA did not reach the 
question of whether there was an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment, but instead 
predicated its reversal of the IJ’s grant of suppression on a finding that Petitioners’ birth 
certificates and [the] arrest records were independently obtained through the use of only their 
names.”); see also Fischer, supra note 116, at 81 (noting that ICE attorneys often successfully 
argue that the government independently obtained the evidence by using the respondent’s 
biographical data).  
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renders most database evidence not subject to the exclusionary rule.203 In 
addition, a name and date of birth may enable the government to collect 
other forms of evidence, such as a foreign birth certificate or consular 
identification card.204 
The legal conclusion that a name and date of birth are pieces of 
identity evidence that categorically cannot be suppressed conflates 
information that has a jurisdictional function with information that has 
an evidentiary function. A name and date of birth, along with one’s body, 
certainly have a jurisdictional function. A name and date of birth ensure 
that a legal proceeding subjects the correct individual to possible legal 
sanction.205 Under the Ker–Frisbie doctrine, the exclusionary rule may 
not serve to strip a court of jurisdiction over the defendant.206 In this 
respect, a name and date of birth cannot be suppressed if the purpose of 
suppression is to render the proceeding unlawful in and of itself. 
But ending the analysis at this point ignores the possibility that a name 
and date of birth serve a separate evidentiary function. In a criminal case, 
the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crime 
is always an element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt.207 “Identity” as used in the context of evidence in a criminal case 
refers to proof that the individual standing before the judge or jury is the 
individual who committed the alleged crime.208 Given the nature of most 
crimes, a suspect’s name and date of birth are not typically necessary 
components of proving identity in a criminal case. This proof is more 
often garnered through an eyewitness, a suspect’s confession, or 
fingerprint evidence.209 If contested in a motion to suppress, this evidence 
                                                                                                                     
 203. See, e.g., Reyes-Basurto v. Holder, 477 F. App’x 788, 789 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding 
suppression of database records not warranted in part due to their discovery on the basis of the 
respondent’s name, which is not suppressible). 
 204. See Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 645 (“Petitioners’ birth certificates were obtained . . . using 
Petitioners’ insuppressible identities . . . .”).  
 205. In actuality, a court does not legally require a name for it to have personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court does not require a name 
for an arrest warrant so long as there is a sufficient description to identify the defendant. See FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1)(A). 
 206. See supra note 66. 
 207. See, e.g., MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 4.15 (2015), 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2014%20Chapter%204%20final.pdf; STATE OF CONN.: 
JUDICIAL BRANCH, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.6-4 (2015), http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/ 
part2/2.6-4.htm. 
 208. See id.  
 209. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 470 F.2d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing the 
sufficiency of fingerprint evidence to prove that the defendant was the individual who committed 
the charged rape offense). There are cases, of course, in which the name of the criminal defendant 
does matter for proof of the alleged crime. See, e.g., People v. Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 1213–
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of identity is subject to the traditional exclusionary rule analysis, that is, 
“fruit of the poisonous” tree principles and, if applicable, the investigative 
versus administrative purpose standard.210 Changing the type of 
evidentiary proof of identity—evidence that is in the form of a name and 
date of birth—does not change the underlying analysis. Evidence of 
identity serves an evidentiary function, in addition to having a 
jurisdictional function, and is therefore also subject to an “evidentiary” 
analysis under the exclusionary rule. 
Further support for the argument that a piece of evidence can have 
both a jurisdictional and evidentiary function (and therefore be subject to 
two different analyses) exists in the role of proof of injury in civil 
proceedings. A plaintiff must produce evidence of an injury caused by 
the defendant’s conduct to have standing to bring a case in civil court.211 
This information has a jurisdictional function because the standing 
doctrine functions as a limit on the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.212 
Proof of injury also has a separate evidentiary function in a plaintiff’s 
case-in-chief and request for damages.213 The fact that the evidence of 
injury may be the same or overlapping does not negate the fact that there 
are distinct doctrinal inquiries guiding the court’s consideration of the 
evidence in each aspect of the case.214 
In immigration proceedings, a name and date of birth serve both a 
jurisdictional function and an evidentiary one. Like in a criminal case, the 
name and date of birth enable the court to accurately impose personal 
jurisdiction over the noncitizen. But in immigration cases, proof of the 
noncitizen’s name and date of birth are also important evidence in the 
government’s case. To deport a person from the United States, the 
government must prove who the person is and that she is not a U.S. 
citizen.215 Significantly, these two functions of a name and date of birth 
                                                                                                                     
14 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that the defendant’s name was necessary to connect him to DMV database 
records demonstrating his legal guilt of the offense of unlicensed operation of a vehicle). 
 210. See, e.g., United States v. Gifford, 549 F. Supp. 206, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (analyzing 
whether evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the mail fraud scheme was “so 
tainted by the unlawful arrest as to be fruit of the poisonous tree . . . .”). 
 211. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 212. See id. at 750–51. 
 213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 214. A similar construct also exists in DNA evidence jurisprudence. In Policing Identity, 
Professor Wayne Logan discusses the Third Circuit’s recognition that there are two components 
to a person’s identity: who a person is (his name and date of birth) and what the person has done. 
See Logan, supra note 16, at 1583 (discussing United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc)). Correspondingly, it is possible to view DNA evidence as having two 
functions—to verify identity and to aid in the investigation of past and future crime—which may 
require separate and distinct doctrinal analyses. Id.  
 215. See case cited supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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are always present in immigration proceedings. In every single removal 
case, the government must establish jurisdiction, and the government’s 
case will require the introduction of identity evidence.216 The Second 
Circuit’s contrasting terms of “identity” and “alienage” are helpful 
constructs to distinguish these two functions of a name and date of birth 
in immigration proceedings.217 The label “identity” can signify facts 
needed for jurisdictional purposes, and the term “alienage” can refer to 
facts introduced to meet the government’s burden of proof for evidentiary 
purposes.218 Using these terms renders more apparent how particular facts 
(i.e., a name and date of birth) might be in both categories, yet treated 
differently for exclusionary rule purposes. An individual in a removal 
proceeding may not suppress his person or “identity” but may seek to 
suppress evidence of “alienage”—evidence related to identity, including 
one’s name and date of birth—gathered as a result of the unlawful 
arrest.219 
Recognizing the evidentiary function of a name and date of birth, in 
addition to their jurisdictional function, has significant consequences. 
Although the name and date of birth would still be admissible to properly 
establish jurisdiction over the defendant, acknowledging the separate and 
distinct evidentiary function of a name and date of birth would, 
correspondingly, require a separate and distinct evidentiary analysis of 
that evidence and the evidence collected on the basis of that knowledge. 
Thus, evidence collected based on police knowledge of the name and date 
of birth, such as a birth certificate or database record, would be subject to 
the traditional exclusionary rule analysis of taint and attenuation,220 and 
would not fall outside the reach of the exclusionary rule remedy.221  
                                                                                                                     
 216. Removal proceedings comprise over ninety-seven percent of immigration court 
proceedings. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 14, at 12. 
 217. In Pretzantzin v. Holder, the Second Circuit used the term “identity” to refer to identity 
evidence that is not suppressible under the exclusionary rule. 736 F.3d 641, 650 (2d Cir. 2013). 
The court used the contrasting term “alienage” to connote identity-related evidence that would be 
suppressible in a removal proceeding but states that “where identity ends and alienage begins” is 
a difficult question. Id. at 650–51. The BIA has also made reference to this framework, noting 
that the “identity of an alien (as distinguished from alienage) is not suppressible . . . .” In re 
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 79 (B.I.A. 1970).  
 218. See Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 644.   
 219. See id. (describing that the petitioners’ did not deny “they were the individuals named 
in the Notices to Appear” but sought to suppress evidence of alienage the government “obtained 
as a consequence of the nighttime, warrantless raid of their home . . . .”).  
 220. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  
 221. Exempting the name, date of birth, and all evidence collected using that information 
implicitly encourages officers to make assumptions based on ethnicity and to guess an individual’s 
country of origin based on a name, appearance, and language. This has the potential to introduce 
nonsensical and troublesome results into the exclusionary rule jurisprudence. Would people from 
particular places fare worse under such a regime? Would a common name in a country be more 
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The current approach to physical evidence in the criminal context 
bolsters this conclusion. A person’s body is not suppressible as it relates 
to its jurisdictional function.222 But that does not render all evidence 
stemming from the body as automatically “independent” in an 
evidentiary analysis. If that were true, fingerprints, hair fibers, and even 
a defendant’s DNA would be categorically exempt from the exclusionary 
rule—a result contrary to current doctrine. Rather, such evidence is 
subject to the traditional exclusionary rule analysis: was the evidence 
obtained “‘by exploitation’ of the primary illegality instead of ‘by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint’?”223 The 
fact that the link between the obtained evidence and the unlawful arrest 
is the suspect’s body—a piece of evidence that for jurisdictional purposes 
is exempt from the exclusionary rule—does not change the chain of 
evidentiary analysis of which the suspect’s body is a part. 
In sum, in an immigration proceeding, a name and date of birth serve 
two separate and distinct functions. With respect to its evidentiary 
function, the court should apply “the normal and generally applicable 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to determine whether challenged 
identity-related evidence should be excluded under the circumstances 
present in the particular case.”224 In other words, under current 
exclusionary rule doctrine, the court must determine whether officers 
collected the noncitizen’s name and date of birth for an investigative or 
administrative purpose.225 
In applying the investigative versus administrative standard to the 
collection of a name and date of birth in the context of immigration 
enforcement today, it is necessary to first discuss the policing act of 
“identification.” Some courts equate the law enforcement need to identify 
the individual before them with a routine act with an administrative 
                                                                                                                     
difficult for the police than a unique one? Would this lead to the policing of particular 
neighborhoods and locations? The potential for racial profiling should not be ignored when 
considering the exemption of a name and date of birth from the suppression remedy. Cf. 
Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “Orhorhaghe’s ‘Nigerian-
sounding name’ is clearly insufficient to justify a seizure” and that “one cannot rationally or 
reliably predict whether an individual is an illegal alien based on the sound of his name”). 
 222. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (“The ‘body’ . . . is never itself suppressible as a fruit 
of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation 
occurred.’’); Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 650 (stating that “an individual cannot escape a tribunal’s 
power over his ‘body’ despite being subject to an illegal seizure”).  
 223. United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). 
 224. United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1112 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 225. But see infra Part III (arguing for stronger suppression protections for identity evidence 
in immigration court). 
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purpose.226 For instance, the Ninth Circuit contrasts evidence taken for 
an “investigatory purpose” from evidence collected “solely for 
identification purposes.”227 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that 
“fingerprints administratively taken in conjunction with an arrest for the 
purpose of simply ascertaining or confirming the identity of the person 
arrested . . . are sufficiently unrelated to the unlawful arrest that they are 
not suppressible.”228 But assuming that the purpose of identification is 
always administrative in nature confuses the important differences 
between “identity verification and investigation.”229 The identification of 
individuals through routine booking procedures is identity verification; it 
is to ensure the police have accurately identified the individual in 
custody.230 This function of identification contrasts with the function at 
work in identity investigation. Return to the seminal case of Davis v. 
Mississippi. In Davis, the police, following an unlawful arrest, collected 
the defendant’s fingerprints to determine whether he was the individual 
who committed the alleged rape.231 This act of identification was 
investigative in nature because the police made the arrest to verify John 
Davis’s identity. Thus, the policing act of identification does not in and 
of itself dictate the legal conclusion regarding the investigative or 
administrative purpose of the identity evidence collection.232 
Like fingerprints, a name and date of birth are pieces of evidence that 
the police can collect for different purposes—or dual purposes—
depending on the factual context.233 Consider the question asked by the 
                                                                                                                     
 226. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 2004); In re 
Christian Rodriguez, A088 190 226 (B.I.A. June 18, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/150133888/ 
Christian-Rodriguez-A088-190-226-BIA-June-18-2013 (“Fingerprints can be considered identity 
evidence if they are obtained for identification purposes, rather than for criminal investigatory 
purposes.”). Under this view, courts could also view many database searches as administrative in 
purpose because these searches are ostensibly conducted with the goal of accurately identifying the 
suspect. 
 227. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d at 867. 
 228. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112–13. 
 229. Logan, supra note 16, at 1563. 
 230. See supra note 62.  
 231. 394 U.S. 721, 723 (1969). 
 232. These two aspects of identification clearly appear in the debate between the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). The Court held that 
obtaining a DNA sample from a felony arrestee without a warrant is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment in large part because of the government’s legitimate interest in accurately identifying 
suspects in its custody (identity verification). See id. at 1970, 1980. The dissent, in contrast, argues 
that the DNA samples police take during booking are not for verification of identity purposes but 
rather are part of the investigation of crime (identity investigation). See id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 233. Cf. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1121 (stating that the court must determine whether 
the fingerprints “were obtained for an investigatory purpose exploiting the unconstitutional arrest 
or whether they were obtained as part of a routine booking procedure not linked to the purpose of 
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Ninth Circuit in United States v. Garcia-Beltran234: was the purpose of 
the evidence collection “solely to establish [the suspect’s] true identity, 
or was it an attempt to connect [the suspect] to alleged illegal activity?”235 
While intended by the court to be a mutually exclusive question for which 
the answer would either allow or prohibit suppression, in the context of 
immigration policing and the acquisition of an individual’s name and date 
of birth, the answer to both questions is “yes.” The policing act of 
identification is part and parcel of the police investigation into 
immigration-related offenses.236 This functional overlap is not 
necessarily true in the context of non-immigration-related criminal 
investigations. When it is true—as it was in Davis and Hayes—then the 
identity evidence is suppressed due to the investigative purpose 
underlying its collection.237  
In the context of police actions that follow an egregious violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, a court should not automatically categorize the 
collection of a name and date of birth as solely an administrative act; the 
need to identify the detained individual often has an investigatory purpose 
in this context. Return to this Article’s hypothetical: after the police 
officer pulls over the driver solely on the basis of his race, he asks the 
driver his name and date of birth, which leads to questions regarding his 
immigration status. In this scenario, the learning of the name and date of 
birth is the nexus between the unlawful conduct and the investigation of 
immigration-related crimes. As the Fourth Circuit explained: 
Hayes and Davis illustrate situations in which law 
enforcement authorities obtained fingerprint evidence by 
“exploitation” of the initial police illegal activity. In both 
                                                                                                                     
the illegal arrest”). The fact that the police may subsequently re-collect an individual’s name and 
birth during the booking process or in subsequent interviews with immigration officials is not 
necessarily dispositive. It is part of the traditional exclusionary rule analysis to determine whether 
the initial unlawful conduct tainted the evidence collected—even evidence collected during a 
subsequent booking process. See id. at 1114 (“This is not to say that fingerprint evidence taken 
after an illegal arrest, even as part of a routine booking procedure, is never suppressible. By 
focusing upon the purpose for an illegal arrest and subsequent fingerprinting in determining 
whether fingerprint evidence is tainted fruit, courts properly focus on effectuating the underlying 
policy of the exclusionary rule.”); see also United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048, 1050 
(10th Cir. 2009) (stating that “when evidence of an individual’s identity is discovered through 
routine booking procedures incident to an unlawful arrest, that evidence is not suppressed unless 
the arrest was purposefully exploited to learn the identity”). 
 234. 389 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 235. Id. at 866. 
 236. This aspect of immigration policing points to the need to reevaluate the use of these 
terms in exclusionary rule doctrine. See infra Part III. 
 237. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text; see also infra note 251 and accompanying 
text (explaining that under exclusionary rule doctrine, evidence collected with both purposes remains 
subject to suppression). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732009
864 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
cases, the police, without probable cause, detained and then 
fingerprinted a person they suspected had committed a 
certain crime, and in both cases the police acted with a clear 
investigative purpose—to tie the fingerprinted suspect to 
that crime.238 
This same reasoning applies to the collection of the name and date of 
birth in the context of egregious Fourth Amendment violations in 
immigration policing. The police often exploit the unlawful detention to 
learn the suspect’s identity and investigate a suspected immigration-
related offense.239 Consequently, in these scenarios, the police collect the 
name and date of birth for an investigative purpose.240  
If a court determines that the police collected the noncitizen’s name 
and date of birth for an investigative purpose, the name and date of birth 
remain “tainted” evidence and part of the causal chain for purposes of the 
exclusionary rule analysis.241 Consequently, the evidence collected based 
on this tainted evidence (e.g., database records and birth certificate) 
should also then be subject to the exclusionary rule under the traditional 
fruit of the poisonous tree principles. 
*    *    * 
An analysis of the nature of identity evidence collection in today’s 
immigration enforcement regime is largely absent from judicial and 
scholarly examinations of exclusionary rule doctrine. Conducting this 
analysis demonstrates that, following egregious violations of the Fourth 
                                                                                                                     
 238. United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2007). The hypothetical 
scenario is more akin to that of Davis v. Mississippi, where “the defendant’s identity and 
connection to the illicit activity were only first discovered through an illegal arrest” (and therefore 
the identity evidence was subject to suppression), as opposed to the situation in United States v. 
Crews, in which the police knew the defendant’s identity prior to the unlawful arrest (and therefore 
the identity evidence was not subject to suppression). 445 U.S. 463, 475 (1980) (analyzing Davis).  
 239. United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 240. Viewing the act of identification as one that may have an investigative purpose is 
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing that the demand for identification 
without reasonable suspicion is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (“When the officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him to 
identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.”); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, “stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check 
his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment”); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004) (holding 
that so long as reasonable suspicion exists, “a police officer is free to ask a person for identification 
without implicating the Fourth Amendment”); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (holding 
that while acting pursuant to a lawful search warrant, the mere questioning of the defendants about 
their citizenship did not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
 241. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.   
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Amendment, the police may collect immigrant identity evidence with 
what courts traditionally consider to be an investigative purpose. Thus, 
current assumptions about the exemption of all or most identity evidence 
from the exclusionary rule remedy in immigration court lack support in 
exclusionary rule doctrine and ignore the practical effects of increased 
cooperation of state and local law enforcement, the growth of database 
policing, and the role of a name and date of birth in the investigation of 
immigration-related offenses. 
III.  THE SUPPRESSION OF IMMIGRANT IDENTITY EVIDENCE 
The call to import criminal law protections into the immigration arena 
is an important one. Noncitizens facing the immense consequence of 
deportation have very few of the substantive and procedural rights that 
all individuals are guaranteed when charged with a crime, no matter how 
minor.242 The application of the exclusionary rule to all Fourth 
Amendment violations is a significant part of this call for additional 
safeguards.243 For the majority of individuals appearing in immigration 
court who suffered a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, there is 
no available remedy.244 Exclusionary rule doctrine as developed in the 
criminal context, however, should not be introduced into immigration 
proceedings without reflection. As seen in its current application to 
identity evidence, even if a noncitizen successfully overcomes the hurdle 
of proving an egregious constitutional violation, and even if the 
exclusionary rule were to apply more broadly, exclusionary rule doctrine 
as currently applied to immigrant identity evidence renders that remedy 
effectively unavailable in immigration court.  
This result is not necessarily contrary to Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
Evidence that the police collect with an administrative purpose or that is 
independent of the initial unlawful police conduct is evidence that the 
exclusionary rule does not intend to suppress. But to the extent that courts 
are confronting exclusionary rule questions as applied to immigrant 
identity evidence, there is no analysis of the underlying purpose of the 
evidence collection. Rather, courts fill judicial opinions with broad 
unequivocal statements, the quick finding of an “independent source,” 
and the assumption that immigrant identity evidence is categorically 
exempt from the exclusionary rule remedy.245  
                                                                                                                     
 242. See Markowitz, supra note 19, at 293–94. 
 243. See supra note 12. 
 244. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.  
 245. See, e.g., Torres-Hernandez v. Holder, 482 F. App’x 931, 931 (5th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (“The BIA and IJ did not err in denying Torres-Hernandez’s motion to suppress. Even if 
she had shown a constitutional violation, the airport immigration agent obtained only her identity 
from her Texas identification card, and her identity is not suppressible. Further, Torres–
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The analysis of immigration policing conducted in Part II 
demonstrates that these conclusions are often unfounded and unjustified. 
Therefore, the fact that immigration courts would not suppress most 
immigrant identity evidence under current judicial thinking is a result 
contrary to the function of the investigative versus administrative 
standard specifically and the animating theory of the exclusionary rule 
generally. In addition, exclusionary rule doctrine as currently applied has 
the unintended effect of disincentivizing behavior by noncitizens that 
some localities have attempted to encourage, such as registering for a 
driver’s license or state identification card or applying for legal status.246 
A possible response to this problem is to suggest that the investigative 
versus administrative standard be retained in the doctrine but applied 
differently. For instance, courts should not conclude that the police 
collect all immigrant identity evidence for an administrative purpose 
simply because the government introduces the evidence in an 
administrative process. As a normative matter, however, such a remedy 
is ultimately unsatisfying because it leaves in place the problematic terms 
of “investigative” and “administrative”—terms that no longer function as 
a meaningful way to help courts distinguish evidence that they should or 
should not suppress. Immigration policing today is a blend of what courts 
have typically considered “administrative” aspects of law enforcement—
verifying the identity of a suspect—with traditional “investigative” police 
conduct—the participation of local law enforcement and the investigation 
of crimes.  
The difficulties of applying the purpose-based standard in practice are 
self-evident: a local police officer purposefully stops a person based on 
her race, investigates her immigration status, conducts computer 
searches, and then turns her over for routine booking and eventually the 
administrative process of removal. In this scenario, it may be impossible 
for a court to discern whether the officer had an administrative or 
investigative purpose, or a court may believe that the officer had both 
purposes in mind at the time of the evidence collection. Although perhaps 
at one point these labels seemed clear in application (the customs agent 
at the airport versus the local officer at the murder scene), today’s 
immigration enforcement realm combines these forms of policing and, 
consequently, renders the terms unhelpful to a coherent doctrinal inquiry 
                                                                                                                     
Hernandez’s alienage and immigration status were not suppressible as this information was 
obtained through an independent search of the Traveler Enforcement Compliance System (TECS) 
after immigration agents learned her identity.” (citations omitted)). 
 246. See Jennifer Medina, California Effort to Issue Driver’s Licenses to Immigrants 
Receives Surge of Applicants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/
us/california-effort-to-issue-drivers-licenses-to-immigrants-receives-surge-of-applicants.html.   
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and often misleading in determining the ultimate result.247 
The investigative versus administrative standard also provides 
insufficient guidance to the individual officer at the “front end” of 
policing. This purpose-based standard is given almost all of its content ex 
post. The evolution of immigration enforcement has made it particularly 
difficult for an officer conducting immigration-related policing to 
determine whether a court may deem his actions investigative or 
administrative in purpose.248 Will the government ultimately prosecute 
the suspect in a criminal or civil court? Will a court consider the database 
search to be administrative, investigative, or independent? Will the name 
and date of birth lead to the discovery of additional identity-related 
evidence? The result of applying current exclusionary rule doctrine when 
evaluating immigrant identity evidence is largely unpredictable to the 
individual police officer. The predictability of the exclusionary rule and 
its proffered guidance for officer conduct matters because of the rule’s 
animating function—the deterrence of unlawful police conduct. Given 
current jurisprudence, the application of the exclusionary rule is at best 
unpredictable and at worst predictable in the negative—courts will not 
suppress identity evidence despite initial unlawful police conduct. If the 
local police officer cannot determine whether identity evidence will be 
suppressed but knows it likely will not be in most cases, then even in the 
rare case where such evidence is suppressed, that suppression will have 
little, if any, deterrent impact on future unconstitutional police conduct.249  
The inability of current exclusionary rule doctrine to accurately and 
reliably address the suppression of immigrant identity evidence therefore 
suggests a different solution. The investigative versus administrative 
standard as applied to identity evidence in immigration court should be 
abandoned, and instead, all identity evidence collected as a result of an 
egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment should be subject to 
                                                                                                                     
 247. The argument that an evaluation of the officer’s purpose is unhelpful to the doctrinal 
inquiry is consistent with other areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine that do not consider the 
subjective motives of police officers. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) 
(stating that in general the subjective motivations of government officials are irrelevant as “the 
Fourth Amendment regulates conduct rather than thoughts”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 812–13 (1996) (discussing precedent that holds that the actual motivations of police officers 
are not part of Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis). 
 248. This unpredictability will of course also affect the application of the exclusionary rule 
in an immigration-related criminal case, as the criminal court applies this same investigative 
versus administrative standard. 
 249. As Professor Hiroshi Motomura points out, “State and local jurisdictions and officers 
that see immigration enforcement as part of their law enforcement duties will be especially 
inclined to view civil removal as a tangible result that makes the arrest worthwhile.” Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1847 (2011). The question in the 
Fourth Amendment context therefore becomes whether the police officer is motivated to refrain 
from unconstitutional police conduct when effectuating an immigration-related arrest. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732009
868 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
suppression under traditional exclusionary rule principles. Stated 
differently, instead of a purpose-based standard for the evaluation of 
identity evidence introduced in immigration proceedings, there would 
simply be the well-established exclusionary rule analysis of exploitation, 
taint, and attenuation like that conducted for more “typical” pieces of 
evidence. In addition to this reform, other aspects of exclusionary rule 
doctrine need to be clarified in the immigration context. As explained in 
Part II, both the independent source exception and the intersection of 
jurisdictional rules with exclusionary rule doctrine need to be reexamined 
to structure an exclusionary rule doctrine that provides for the 
suppression of immigrant identity evidence that law enforcement initially 
collected with an investigative purpose. 
One outcome of this proposal would likely be the suppression of more 
evidence in immigration proceedings than occurs under current doctrine. 
But this result is not objectionable for several reasons. First, as previously 
explained, the investigative and administrative labels protect evidence 
from suppression in immigration court that the doctrine intends to 
suppress to optimally deter unlawful police conduct. Therefore, an 
increase in suppression orders is normatively desirable in the immigration 
context.250 Second, in cases in which an officer might have both an 
administrative and investigative purpose, it is appropriate under existing 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to hold that, due to the presence of an 
investigative purpose and the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule 
remedy, evidence collected for both purposes should be suppressed.251 
Third, any increase in suppression may only be temporary. In theory, the 
suppression of immigrant identity evidence today would deter unlawful 
police conduct tomorrow. Consequently, the frequency of the 
suppression of evidence would eventually diminish because the police 
conduct justifying such suppression would similarly decrease over time.  
This Article recognizes that underlying much of this argument is the 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule works as a means of deterrence and 
that it guides and shapes police behavior.252 But acknowledging that the 
                                                                                                                     
 250. In the criminal context, the investigative versus administrative standard does not 
improperly shield evidence collected with an investigative purpose to the same extent because 
such evidence, as it is not used in an administrative proceeding, is not automatically deemed 
administrative in nature. 
 251. See United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 2007); see also United 
States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Evidence can be obtained ‘by 
exploitation’ of an unlawful detention even when the detention is not for the sole purpose of 
gathering that evidence.”).  
 252. It is outside the scope of this Article to address the debate over whether the exclusionary 
rule actually works as a means of deterrence. See Re, supra note 12, at 1889 (discussing scholars 
on both sides of the debate). This Article sides with the position that it does. See Albert W. 
Alschuler, Regarding Re’s Revision: Notes on the Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. 
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exclusionary rule may not influence police conduct as much as one might 
hope does not also dictate ignoring the problems contained in current 
exclusionary rule doctrine and its application. There are several 
justifications for maintaining a focus on the exclusionary rule and for 
specifically adopting a more robust exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings. First, in determining whether the exclusionary rule should 
apply in any particular setting, the costs of excluding probative evidence 
are weighed against the need for a deterrent effect.253 In immigration 
enforcement today, there is a strong need for a mechanism to deter 
unlawful police conduct. Although initially thought to be a small number 
of legal claims,254 allegations of egregious unconstitutional police 
conduct have grown exponentially in number.255 With the entanglement 
of state and local law enforcement in federal immigration enforcement, 
quantitative and qualitative data suggests that there has been a numerical 
increase in alleged Fourth Amendment violations.256 More specifically, 
data suggests that racial profiling by local police is of grave concern in 
immigration enforcement today.257 The potential for racial profiling is 
                                                                                                                     
REV. F. 302, 324 n.87 (2014) (stating that “the exclusionary rule has demonstrably changed police 
conduct for the better”). 
 253. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984) (explaining the Janis 
balancing test). 
 254. See id. at 1044 (noting that, according to BIA statistics, very few noncitizens challenged 
their arrests or the introduction of evidence).  
 255. See Elias, supra note 12, at 1127–35 (documenting the rise of alleged Fourth 
Amendment violations by law enforcement in both number and geographic scope); N.Y. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., JUSTICE DERAILED: WHAT RAIDS ON NEW YORK’S TRAINS AND BUSES 
REVEAL ABOUT BORDER PATROL’S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 16 (2011), 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_justicederailedweb_0.pdf (detailing the 
disproportionate impact of transportation raids in the Rochester, New York area on people of 
color); BESS CHIU ET AL., CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID 
OPERATIONS, CARDOZO IMMIGR. JUST. CLINIC 22 (2009), http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/ 
files/Constitution%20On%20ICE--A%20Report%20on%20Immigration%20Home%20Raid% 
20Operations%20-%20Cardozo%20Law%20School_0.pdf (documenting the rise of suppression 
motions and potential constitutional violations by ICE during home raid operations since 2006). 
 256. See N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., supra note 255. 
 257. See Cynthia Benin, Note, Randomizing Immigration Enforcement: Exploring A New 
Fourth Amendment Regime, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1735, 1748–49 (2013) (documenting evidence of 
racial profiling in immigration enforcement); Chacón, supra note 111, at 340–41 (cataloguing 
evidence of the rise in racial profiling claims in immigration enforcement by local police); 
Wishnie, supra note 12, at 1102–13 (documenting the rise in racial profiling and selective 
immigration enforcement based on ethnicity following the involvement of local police in 
immigration enforcement post-September 2001); Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. 
Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien Program, WARREN INST.: POL’Y BRIEF 1 
(2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf (finding evidence of 
racial profiling by local police officers in a study of arrest data in Irving, Texas following the 
police department’s participation in federal immigration enforcement); see also Kevin R. Johnson, 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732009
870 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
particularly acute when there are financial, legislative, and other 
incentives for local law enforcement to assist with the enforcement of 
federal immigration law,258 and when, as Professors Devon Carbado and 
Cheryl Harris have argued, current Fourth Amendment doctrine “enables 
and sanctions racial profiling.”259  
Second, recent clarifications in immigration law positively impact the 
deterrent benefit of the suppression of evidence in immigration court. In 
the past, several courts, including the Supreme Court in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, suggested that the deterrent benefit of suppressing evidence in 
removal proceedings is slight because the government could simply 
detain the noncitizen the very next minute because “a person whose 
unregistered presence in this country, without more, constitutes a crime. 
His release within our borders would immediately subject him to criminal 
penalties.”260 This oft-repeated comment, however, is no longer good 
law. In Arizona v. United States,261 the Supreme Court made clear that 
unlawful status alone is not a crime.262 The police therefore could not 
simply re-arrest a noncitizen the moment he left the immigration 
courtroom. Law enforcement would need probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion of a criminal offense to detain the individual.263 Even if the 
police could easily re-arrest or detain the individual, from the perspective 
of Fourth Amendment doctrine, “courts can protect the innocent against 
such invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding 
evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty.”264 
                                                                                                                     
The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH U. L.Q. 675, 701 (2000) 
(describing race-based immigration enforcement conducted by state and local governments). 
 258. See supra notes 121–23. 
 259. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 1543, 1583 (2011). 
 260. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1984) (footnote omitted); see also United 
States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lopez-Mendoza). 
 261. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 262. Id. at 2505 (“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present 
in the United States.”). 
 263. Although unlawful status itself is no longer considered a “continuing violation,” a 
criminal violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (Reentry of Removed Aliens) may be different, and 
therefore the weighing of the costs and benefits of applying this reform in the criminal context 
may be different. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval-Vasquez, 519 F. Supp. 2d 198, 201 (D. 
Mass. 2007) (“[B]ecause section 1326 defines a ‘continuing’ violation, if the court were to 
suppress all evidence of Sandoval–Vasquez’s identity and dismiss the indictment, upon his setting 
foot outside the courtroom, he would again be in violation of the statute, as he would still be a 
person ‘found’ in the United States without authorization after a prior deportation.”). However, 
just like other criminal offenses that may in some sense be “continuing” (e.g., driving on a 
suspended license and failure to register as a sex offender), the police must wait for lawful grounds 
to approach and detain the individual. See Logan, supra note 16, at 1608–09. 
 264. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
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Some courts have suggested there would be little deterrent benefit in 
excluding identity evidence in criminal court because “[other] evidence 
recovered in the course of an illegal stop remains subject to the 
exclusionary rule.”265 In other words, the exclusionary rule still has a 
deterrent effect on criminal investigations generally because the police 
are reluctant to risk having other evidence suppressed, such as firearms 
or narcotics. This reasoning does not apply in the immigration context. 
Identity evidence is the entirety of the government’s case in removal 
proceedings. Consequently, the collection of immigrant identity evidence 
may be the driving force of the unlawful police conduct. If there is only 
an unpredictable exclusionary rule remedy in immigration court, or one 
that courts apply with little chance of suppression, then there is 
effectively no mechanism of deterrence present in the context of 
immigration policing. A more protective exclusionary rule vis-à-vis 
immigrant identity evidence is needed precisely because there is no other 
aspect of the exclusionary rule providing the necessary deterrence 
function. Furthermore, allowing the exclusionary rule to more broadly 
suppress identity evidence in immigration court places no additional 
burden on law enforcement officers with respect to guiding and shaping 
their own conduct. The strictures of the Fourth Amendment already bind 
local police officers.266 
It is important to remember that, in immigration proceedings, 
suppression would only be triggered once a judge found the initial police 
conduct to be an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Consequently, in weighing the costs and benefits of the application of the 
exclusionary rule, the benefit at issue is that of deterring egregiously 
unlawful police conduct. This particular benefit is different in the 
criminal context, where a parallel rule would also impose the cost of 
suppression on “mere garden-variety” Fourth Amendment violations.267 
In addition, the suppression of evidence in the immigration context, 
although not available as a remedy to all Fourth Amendment violations, 
may ultimately serve a deterrent function for unconstitutional police 
                                                                                                                     
 265. People v. Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (N.Y. 2010). 
 266. The Fourth Amendment also binds federal immigration officers when effectuating civil 
immigration arrests. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 881–82 (1975); 
Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 284–85 (3d Cir. 2012); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 
217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 267. Lopez-Fernandez v. Holder, 735 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 2013). A few courts in the 
criminal context have suggested that an egregious Fourth Amendment violation might affect their 
exclusionary rule analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(stating that “absent the kind of egregious circumstances referred to in Lopez-Mendoza,” the 
defendant could not suppress his immigration file); United States v. Aragon-Robles, 45 F. App’x 
590, 591 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that identity evidence may be subject to suppression if the 
defendant’s race motivated the unlawful detention). 
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conduct more broadly, without the associated cost of suppressing 
evidence in all instances. 
Finally, and most significantly, although the Constitution and 
substantive criminal law impose additional restraints on police 
investigation,268 these limits on police power largely do not apply to 
suspects facing investigation for civil immigration offenses.269 In 
addition, civil remedies—proffered alternatives to the exclusionary 
rule—are not readily available to noncitizens making race discrimination 
claims against law enforcement.270 The absence of other mechanisms for 
the deterrence of unlawful police conduct is significant because today 
many local police encounters with noncitizens result in civil removal 
hearings, not charges in criminal court.271 Imposing a more robust 
exclusionary rule in the immigration context therefore prohibits officers 
from purposefully shaping their conduct “to avoid criminal rules meant 
to restrain police behavior.”272  
Specific aspects of the immigration context justify this Article’s 
argument for judicial reform of exclusionary rule doctrine. But the 
Article’s analysis of the policing of immigrant identity evidence has 
implications for exclusionary doctrine in other areas. For one, the 
investigative versus administrative standard has also lost its doctrinal 
function when evaluating the suppression of immigrant identity evidence 
in the criminal context. While the overall balancing of the interests 
underlying the application of the exclusionary rule may be different in 
the two court systems, the problems in applying this purpose-based 
standard to immigrant identity evidence, and sometimes even to identity 
                                                                                                                     
 268. For instance, the limits on police interrogation from Miranda and its progeny and the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel. See Eda Katharine Tinto, Wavering on Waiver: Montejo v. 
Louisiana and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1335, 1338–42 
(2011). 
 269. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Chacón, supra note 111, at 341–42 (discussing the Supreme Court precedent of 
Whren v. United States and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee); see also 
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012) (reaffirming the qualified immunity of 
law enforcement officers); De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 380 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
noncitizens are barred from bringing Bivens actions against federal officers for unlawful acts 
leading up to civil removal proceedings). Additionally, once an individual is deported following 
a removal proceeding, the practical difficulties of continuing litigation often trump an individual’s 
desire to challenge the constitutional violation. 
 271. See Cade, supra note 125, at 183.  
 272. See Eagly, supra note 20, at 1289. Professor Eagly goes on to note that immigration law 
has inverted the traditional police power relationship between civil and criminal enforcement. 
Although typically the police have more power in the criminal system, “[c]ivil immigration law 
invites opportunities to arrest, interrogate, and detain without the need to comply with criminal 
law’s requirements.” Id. at 1339; see also Carbado & Harris, supra note 259, at 1550 (arguing 
that police are using immigration violations “as a pretext for investigating state criminal law”). 
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evidence more broadly, remain the same. In addition, developments in 
the policing of identity evidence may affect the evaluation of the need for 
the deterrence of unlawful police conduct, and consequently the 
exclusionary rule, in other civil settings—such as civil penalties and tax 
proceedings. 
In sum, with regard to police conduct underlying egregious Fourth 
Amendment violations, an individual’s immigrant identity is often “the 
objective of official illegality.”273 When this is so, “the deterrence 
purpose of the exclusionary rule would effectively be served only by 
excluding the very evidence sought to be obtained by the primary illegal 
behavior.”274 Exclusionary rule doctrine as currently applied to identity 
evidence in immigration proceedings wrongly safeguards this very 
evidence from suppression. The proposed revisions to exclusionary rule 
doctrine strengthen the needed mechanism to fulfill the rule’s deterrence 
function and work to suppress immigrant identity evidence unlawfully 
and egregiously obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
Without an effective exclusionary rule doctrine as applied to 
immigrant identity evidence, there is no meaningful judicial review of 
much of the police conduct in immigration enforcement today. Given that 
this conduct necessarily contains allegations of “egregiousness,” the lack 
of judicial scrutiny is especially troubling. As the Supreme Court recently 
stated, “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and 
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the 
justice system.”275 These conditions are met in the context of egregious 
violations of the Fourth Amendment, and justify a reformulated 
exclusionary rule doctrine with respect to the suppression of identity 
evidence in civil immigration proceedings. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 273. United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1120 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 274. Id.; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“[The] purpose [of the 
exclusionary rule] is . . . to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”); Excluding from Evidence 
Fingerprints Taken After an Unlawful Arrest, Notes & Comments, 69 YALE L.J. 432, 436 n.24 
(1960) (noting that the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule depends on excluding the piece of 
evidence that is the target of the police activity). 
 275. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 134, 144 (2009). 
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